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When bidders in an auction collude—and, thus, reduce competitive bidding pressure—the 
resulting cartel is known as a “bidding ring.” A ring can take many forms. An extensive theoreti-
cal literature exists that explores optimal ways to organize ring activity, given the form of target 
auction that the ring is seeking to exploit (see, for example, Daniel Graham and Robert Marshall 
1987; R. Preston McAfee and John McMillan 1992; Andzrej Skryzypacz and Hugo Hopenhayn 
2004; and Kenneth Hendricks, Robert Porter, and Guofu Tan 2003). Empirical work on ring 
activity has tended to focus on issues of ring detection (see Joseph E. Harrington Jr. 2008 for a 
survey). The detection of collusion and the determination of damages rely on drawing distinc-
tions between market conduct with, and without, an active ring. Hence, understanding the prac-
ticalities of ring conduct is central to this endeavor. This paper contributes to this understanding 
by documenting and analyzing the conduct of a ring in the market for collectible stamps in North 
America that lasted for over 15 years.
The data used in this study comprise a record of the ring’s activities for an entire year, includ-
ing sidepayments, detailed bidding behavior in the internal “knockout” auction that the ring used 
to coordinate its activities, and data on the associated “target” auctions. These data are, as far as 
I am aware, unique.
1 In addition to providing documentation of the way that this long-running 
ring operated and the practical problems that it faced, these data allow an assessment of the dam-
ages that the ring imposed, who suffered the damages, the extent to which market ef ciency was 
compromised, and by how much the ring bene ted from its operation.
The results emphasize three aspects of ring conduct. First, the internal coordinating mecha-
nisms employed by a ring can lead to inef cient market allocations, even in an English target 
1 The closest comprehensive dataset of which I am aware are the  nancial records of a drug dealing organization 
analyzed by Steven Levitt and Sudhir Venkatesh (2000).
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auction and even with ring members who are (ex ante) symmetric.
2 Second, not all ring members 
have equal bidding strength.
3 The ring studied in this paper appears to have had at least one 
member who was suf ciently weak, as compared to the other ring members, that his stated moti-
vation for participating in the ring was the prospect of receiving sidepayments rather than acquir-
ing cheap stamps. The presence of these weaker members is suggested as a justi cation for the 
particular mechanism the ring employed.
4 Lastly, due to incentives created by the sidepayment 
structure of the ring mechanism, the ring imposed damages on both sellers and other, nonring, 
bidders in the targeted auctions. Nonring bidders were damaged by misallocation caused by the 
ring mechanism and also by a (somewhat counterintuitive) tendency on the part of the ring to 
push prices higher than would have been the case in a competitive target auction.
Until July 1997, 11 wholesale stamp dealers were members of this bidding ring.
5 The ring was 
active in auctions of collectible stamps, typically stamp collections, that occurred primarily in 
New York auction houses (which conduct open outcry ascending price (or English) auctions). 
The ring’s activities started at some point during the late 1970s or early 1980s. Thus, it existed for 
15 to 20 years, with very few changes in membership after the  rst  ve years. The ring collapsed 
when it was brought to the attention of antitrust enforcement by a stamp dealer not in the ring.
This ring operated through the use of a knockout auction that operated before the target auc-
tion. Before each target auction, ring members would submit a sealed bid on each lot that they 
were interested in.
6 The highest knockout bidder on each lot received the stamps for sale if the 
ring won them in the target auction. The knockout bids were also used to set the bidding limit 
of the ring in the target auction and the sidepayments that individual ring members received. An 
important feature of the knockout mechanism (described in detail below) is that the greater the 
difference between the ring member’s knockout bid and the price in the target auction (target 
price), the greater the sidepayment received.
An equilibrium analysis of the incentives created by the knockout mechanism makes it clear 
that a well speci ed model is required to evaluate damages, ef ciency impacts and the returns to 
the ring. This is because the ring members have an incentive to bid higher in the knockout than 
their actual valuations. This is due to the feature that sidepayments increase in the bid submitted 
(Graham, Marshall, and Richard 1990  rst noted the overbidding induced by this class of knock-
out auctions). Since knockout bids are not equal to underlying valuations, a structural econo-
metric model is proposed and estimated that allows the distribution of valuations to be inferred 
from observed bids. From this model, damages, ef ciency costs and returns to the ring can be 
quanti ed. The approach taken is closest to that of Elena Krasnokutskaya (2004), who adapts the 
nonparametric approach of Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) to accommodate auction level 
heterogeneity observed by the bidders but not by the econometrician. Like Krasnokutskaya, this 
paper  nds that modeling unobserved auction level heterogeneity has an economically   signi cant 
impact on the point estimates emerging from the structural analysis. In addition, the model with 
unobserved heterogeneity performs much better at replicating moments observed in the raw data.
2 The inef ciency of rings is widely appreciated in, for example,  rst price target auctions and in settings where the 
ring members draw their valuations from different distribution (i.e., are ex ante asymmetric).
3 To add some precision, in an IPV auction model bidder strength would be a consequence of differences in the dis-
tribution from which bidders draw valuations. Weaker ring members would have value distributions that tend to place 
more mass on lower valuations.
4 McAfee and McMillan (1992) introduce the notion of an “insincere” bidder, which corresponds to an extreme form 
of heterogeneity in ring member strength.
5 The number of active ring members appears to have  uctuated over the course of time. There were 11 active mem-
bers in the auctions analyzed in this paper.
6 The exact timing of the knockout relative to the target seems to have varied. At one auction (the Harmer-Schau 
sale) the ring coordinated on bidding the night before the auction. More usually, there seems to have been at least a few 
days between knockout and target.JUNE 2010 726 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
The structural econometric model provides considerable economic insight. The overbidding 
phenomenon introduced by the knockout mechanism results in instances where the seller actu-
ally bene ts from the ring’s activity since overbidding can push target prices higher than they 
otherwise would be. This offsets the detriment that the ring can impose on the seller, reducing 
damages below “naïve” estimates (computed by interpreting knockout bids as true revelations of 
underlying valuations). Paying careful attention to the equilibrium incentives created by the ring 
mechanism results in a reduction in the level of inferred damages to the seller, conditional on the 
ring’s winning a target auction, on the order of 50 percent.
Overbidding may occasionally bene t the seller, but it imposes damages on nonring bidders 
and can cause misallocation and, hence, inef ciency. Nonring bidders may suffer damages either 
by having their prices arti cially in ated or by failing to obtain an object that they would have 
won in a truly competitive bidding environment. The structural model suggests that damages to 
other bidders may be at least as large as the damages to the seller. Interestingly, while ef ciency 
is reduced by the ring’s activity, the decrease is not economically signi cant, as compared to the 
impact of a change in participation.
Lastly, it is found that the ring, while occasionally hurting itself by overbidding, did bene t 
from coordinating bidding efforts.
That the realized sidepayment is an increasing function of the difference between the submit-
ted knockout bid and the target price places this ring mechanism in a class of knockout auction 
mechanisms  rst considered by Graham, Marshall, and Richard (1990). Knockout auctions of 
this class have a long history, particularly in markets for collectibles, such as rare books, art, 
rugs, stamps, coins, and antiques. A notable example is the 1919 sale of the library of Ruxley 
Lodge, England.
7 At this auction, 81 London booksellers combined to form a ring. This ring 
operated via a series of posttarget knockouts in which ring members bid for the lot that had been 
acquired. The revenue raised in each knockout round was shared equally among the participants, 
with the more successful participants being invited to participate in subsequent rounds (thus 
increasing sidepayments as announced willingness to pay increased). This procedure resulted in 
at least four rounds of 81, 24, 15, and,  nally, 8 ring members. The subsequent knockout rounds 
generated additional revenues of £10,292 on top of the £3,161 paid in the target auction (see the 
extensive account in Arthur Freeman and Janet Freeman 1990, and the summary by Robert 
Porter 1992). As Graham, Marshall and Richard demonstrate, the equilibrium properties of a 
mechanism like that used in the Ruxley Lodge ring mirror those of the mechanism used by the 
stamp ring considered in this paper. Other observed variations in ring implementation belonging 
to this class are recorded by Charles Smith (1989), Ralph Cassady (1967), and Robert Wraight 
(1974) in markets for farm land, collectible guns, rugs, antiques, and paintings, with the earliest 
recorded example of a ring using a knockout belonging to this class being in 1830, in a sale for 
books (documented in Freeman and Freeman).
The next section describes the ring mechanism in detail and relates the subsequent  ndings 
to the existing literature. Section II discusses the equilibrium incentives created by the ring 
mechanism in an independent private value (IPV) setting and discusses why a ring mechanism 
of the form used by the stamp cartel may be attractive. Section III then discusses the dataset used 
in the study. Reduced form analysis of the data is presented in Section IV, a signi cant  nding 
being the likely presence of weaker bidders. Section V then discusses the structural approach 
adopted in the rest of the paper. It provides an overview of the econometric methods that should 
allow readers less interested in econometric detail to skip Section VI and proceed straight to 
the results. Section VI presents the details of the econometric approach used in estimating the 
7 Prior to 1927, bidding rings were legal in the United Kingdom.VOL. 100 NO. 3 727 ASKER: A STUDY OF THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF A BIDDING CARTEL
structural model. The results of the structural model are presented in Section VII. Section VIII 
concludes.
I.  A Description of the Ring’s Internal Organization
The ring used an internal auction or “knockout” to coordinate bidding. Ring members would 
send a fax or supply a written bid to an agent (a New York taxi and limousine driver employed 
by the ring), indicating the lots in which they were interested, and what they were willing to bid 
for them in the knockout auction. The taxi driver would then collate all the bids, determine the 
winner of each lot, notify the ring as to the winners in the knockout and send the bids to another 
ring member who would coordinate the sidepayments after the target auction was concluded. 
Depending on who actually won the knockout, the taxi driver would, usually, either bid for the 
winner in the target auction, using the bid supplied in that auction as the upper limit, or organize 
for another auction agent to bid for the winner on the same basis. In the language of auction theory, 
the knockout was conducted using a sealed bid format, with the winning bidder getting the right 
to own the lot should it be won by the ring in the target auction. The winning bid in the knockout 
set the stopping point for the ring’s bidding in the target auction.
8 Since bidding in the target auc-
tion was handled by the ring’s agent, monitoring compliance with this policy was not a problem.
Sidepayments were used by the ring to compensate ring members for not competing for a 
lot, when the ring was successful in winning that lot. The determination of sidepayments is 
explained using the following example:
In example 1, the winner of the knockout auction was bidder A, who bid $9,000. The ring 
was successful in the target auction, winning the lot for $6,750. Since bidder J bid only $5,100 
in the knockout auction, he was not eligible for a sidepayment since his bid in the knockout was 
less than the target auction price. Bidders B and G bid more than the target auction price, and so 
both are eligible for a sidepayment. The computation begins with bidder B’s bid of $7,500. The 
difference between $7,500 and the target auction price is $750. The knockout winner, bidder A, 
keeps half this amount. The other half is split equally between bidders B and G, resulting in each 
getting $187.50. This is the only sidepayment bidder B gets. Bidder G bid higher than bidder B 
and so is eligible for a further payment. The winner of the knockout, bidder A, keeps half the 
increment between bidder G’s bid and bidder B’s bid and gives the balance, $250, to bidder G.
8 Recall that that target auction is an English auction.
Example 1: Sidepayments from a successful acquisition in a target auction, Sotheby’s, June 24, 1997, Lot 49
Knockout auction Bid ($) Sidepayment
Bidder A 9,000   
7,500   6,750
  ________ 
2
      
8,000   7,500
  ________ 
2
     =  625 
Bidder G 8,000 +  
7,500   6,750
  ________ 
2
       
1  __  2    + 
8,000   7,500
  ________ 
2
     = 437.50 
Bidder B 7,500 +  
7,500   6,750
  ________ 
2
       
1  __  2    =187.50 
Bidder J 5,100 0 
Target auction price 6,750JUNE 2010 728 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Thus, the sidepayments involve ring members sharing each increment between bids, provided 
that their bids are above the target auction price. Half the increment is kept by the winner of the 
knockout, and the balance is shared equally between those bidders who bid equal to or more 
than the “incremental” bid. The sidepayments were aggregated and settled on a quarterly basis.
Occasionally, the bids in the knockout auction tied for the winning position. In these instances, 
the ring’s agent had discretion as to who won. He allocated the winning position after talking 
to the parties and “tr[ied] as much as possible to be fair” in whom he chose, taking into account 
any previous tied bids.
The special position of the ring’s agent (the taxi driver) in this mechanism is notable. It raises 
the question of what the incentives of this agent were. For instance, the ring would be vulnerable 
to collusion between the agent and a subset of ring members. The agent was primarily managed 
by one of the more active ring members, who also oversaw the payments among ring members. 
This member paid the agent $30 an hour, and each ring member paid the agent a further $50 for 
each target auction that they were active in. The depositions collected during the prosecution 
of this ring directly addressed the issue of whether the agent ever let ring members know the 
knockout bid of other ring members before the knockout was completed. The depositions make it 
clear that this never occurred: neither the coordinating ring member nor any other ring member 
received this kind of assistance from the agent.
Prior to the late 1980s, the ring used a slightly different variant of this sidepayment system. 
The difference was that each increment was split equally among all eligible bidders. So, in the 
above example, the $750 increment between the target auction price and bidder B’s bid would 
have been shared three ways, with the winner, bidder G and bidder B, getting $250 each. This 
is the same as if they treated the bids as true willingness to pay and gave each ring member his 
imputed Shapley value (Graham and Marshall 1987 make this point in their theoretical discus-
sion of nested knockouts).
The evidence on the enforcement of the rings rules is limited. During the early years of the 
ring, at least two members were ejected, one for not meeting his  nancial obligations and another 
for being felt to be interested only in collecting sidepayments. The records of the case indicate 
that deviant bidding behavior—behavior that did not comply with the rules of the ring—was 
either not a problem or not detected by the ring. For instance, there is no suggestion of members 
bidding and losing in the knockout and then participating in the target auction anyway. Similarly, 
there is no record of people getting temporarily suspended from ring membership. Instead, all 
accounts agree that the ring was very stable over the 15 or so years it operated.
9
There is some evidence that one auction house was aware that some sort of ring was active in this 
market and communicated this to the ring. In response the ring did not operate at this auction house. 
It is unclear to what extent other auction houses were aware of the ring’s activities. In the  nal few 
years of operation the ring became more sensitive to hiding its activities and in some target auctions 
would use the ring’s agent, other professional bidding agents (who were not made aware of the ring), 
and its own members to enter bids, to make it less obvious that a ring was active. No detail exists 
on whether anything speci c prompted this move to a slightly less transparent mode of operation.
A. Relationship to Previous Literature
A growing theoretical literature exists on the optimal design of bidding rings. Graham and 
Marshall (1987) and George Mailath and Peter Zemsky (1991) study collusion in second price 
and English auctions, while McAfee and McMillan (1992) study  rst price auctions. More recent 
9 That said, it is also clear that ring members were not averse to bickering amongst themselves.VOL. 100 NO. 3 729 ASKER: A STUDY OF THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF A BIDDING CARTEL
papers by Skryzypacz and Hopenhayn (2004), Robert Marshall and Leslie Marx (2006), and 
Yeon-Koo Che and Jinwoo Kim (2009) provide results on dynamic collusion, rings with limited 
power, and the options open to a strategic seller, respectively. Hendricks, Porter, and Tan (2003) 
extend the basic model to af liated and common value environments and show that data from 
joint bidding in oil and gas drilling rights auctions are consistent with the theory.
Of particular interest is the work of Giuseppe Lopomo, Robert Marshall, and Leslie Marx 
(2005) which shows that, when the knockout occurs after the target auction and the mechanism 
has (ex post) budget balance, inef ciency is inevitable. That is, there does not exist a scheme, 
however complicated and impractical, that can implement allocative ef ciency. The  ndings of 
Lopomo, Marshall, and Marx suggest that the qualitative empirical  ndings of this study are 
likely to be re ected in other cartels operating at English auctions.
10
Alongside the theoretical literature, an empirical literature on bidding rings has developed. 
Laura Baldwin, Robert Marshall, and Jean-Francois Richard (1997), Robert Porter and Douglas 
Zona (1993, 1999) and Patrick Bajari and Lixin Ye (2003) propose tests for the detection of cartel 
activity in highway construction, timber, and milk auctions, respectively. Susan Athey, Jonathon 
Levin, and Enrique Seira (2004) also test for collusion in timber auctions.
11
As in this study, Martin Pesendorfer (2000) examines the activity of a known cartel in the 
market for milk provided to high schools. He uses extensive data on the target auctions but says 
little about the internal workings of the cartel. He is limited to making inferences about the ring’s 
internal structure from the outcomes of bidding in the target auctions. The data used in this paper 
mirror those used by Pesendorfer: their strength is the detail about the internal mechanism used 
by the cartel, and their weakness is the relative lack of data on the target auction (only the win-
ning bid is recorded, together with whether the cartel won the target).
In the empirical auction literature, this paper is closest to that of John Kwoka (1997). Kwoka 
observes the bids and sidepayments from 30 knockouts used to allocate real estate among mem-
bers of a ring. The data that Kwoka uses are unclear as to the exact form of the sidepayment 
mechanism in all but ten auctions. However, under reasonable assumptions, Kwoka estimates 
that the ring distorted prices downward by up to 32 percent.
Within the wider literature on cartels, the work here is closest to that of David Genesove and 
Wallace Mullin (2001), who use notes on cartel meetings to examine the internal operation of the 
US sugar cartel, which operated until 1936. Signi cantly, they  nd that some cheating did occur 
but was met with only limited punishment. Like Genesove and Mullin’s sugar data, the data used 
here allow the inner workings of the stamp ring to be examined. Lars-Hendrik Roller and Frode 
Steen (2006) conduct a similar study on the Norwegian cement industry.
II.  Properties of the Ring Mechanism
The ring mechanism described above creates some counterproductive incentives for the ring 
members. The analysis below establishes that the ring members had an incentive to bid higher 
than their valuations in the knockout auction, that this introduces an inef ciency in the target 
auction, and that other bidders and the ring itself, in addition to the seller (auctioneer), may suffer 
from this. It also provides the theoretical model estimated in the structural analysis. The model 
is an adaptation of the Graham, Marshall, and Richard (1990) model.
Let the value to each bidder i   I in knockout auction k be given by vik   [    _  v  i  ,  
_
  v  i  ], which is 
drawn from a distribution Fi  (v). It is assumed that bidders’ valuations are independently drawn 
from bidder speci c distributions and are private information. Ring members are assumed to know 
10 Lopomo, Marshall, and Marx mention several court cases that  t this fact pattern.
11 Harrington (2008) surveys the literature on cartel detection.JUNE 2010 730 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
the number of bidders bidding in the knockout but are uncertain about the identity of the other bid-
ders. The probability of each bidder’s participating is assumed to be known and is denoted  j  . This 
structure seems to give the most reasonable approximation to the data, given that the number of 
bidders in a knockout is somewhat predictable from observables, but the identities of bidders, as is 
made clear in the accounts of the knockout in the depositions, are not known ex ante.
The way that the ring was organized meant that the winning knockout bid became the bidding 
limit of the ring in the target auction. Since the target auction was an ascending open outcry auc-
tion, the equilibrium bidding strategy of bidders outside the ring, in the target, is to raise the bid 
on any competing bidder so long as the price does not exceed their valuation. That is, standard 
arguments for ascending (English) auction formats apply. This simple equilibrium structure in 
the target helps make analysis of equilibrium bidding in the knockout auction tractable.
12
It is assumed that there is an equilibrium of the knockout auction in which each bidder fol-
lows a strategy   ˜ 
  
  b  i
*. It is assumed that these strategies are increasing in vi  , differentiable and 
have inverses  i =   ˜ 
  
  b  i
 1. The bidding problem of each ring member in the knockout can then be 
expressed as
(1)   max     
b
         
    
b
         (vik   x)  hr  (x) dxF i  ( (b))     1  __  2       
    
b
             
x  
b
       (  y   x)hr  (x)  f i  ( (  y)) dydx
  +   1  __  2       
    
b
         (b   x)  hr  (x) dx 1   F i  ( (b))
where vik is the value of winning the item for sale in the target auction. r is the highest value 
from amongst the bidders in the target auction who are not in the ring (nonring bidders). Hr  (·) 
is  the  distribution  function  of  r  and  hr  (·)  is  the  corresponding  density  function.  F i ( (b))
= (       j i   
 
         j Fj  ( j  (b)))/     j i   
 
         j and f i  ( (b)) =  F i  ( (b))/ b.
The  rst-order condition of this maximization problem is given by
(vik   b)h  r(b)F i( (b)) +     
    
b
         (vik   x)h  r(x) dx f i  ( (b))
        
    
b
      (b   x)h  r(x)f i( (b)) dx  +   1  __  2       
    
b
        hr(x) dx 1   F i( (b)) = 0.
With two knockout bidders, this expression simpli es to
13
12 The auction houses’ catalogs all report the existence of secret reserve prices. For example, Christie’s Oct. 22, 1996 
sale catalog reads: “The reserve price is the minimum price the seller is willing to accept and below which a lot will not 
be sold. This amount is con dential and does not exceed the low presale estimate. Property offered for sale subject to a 
reserve is indicated by the symbol * next to the lot number.” Every lot is indicated as having a reserve price. However, 
in the data there is no evidence that this reserve price ever binds. The model does not attempt to model the reserve 
price, due to the lack of any data on it and the lack of evidence suggesting it has an effect on bidding (e.g., that the secret 
reserve price lay within the support of the distribution of valuations or was enforced). Similarly, accounts of auction 
practice (e.g., Cassady 1967 and Wraight 1974) mention the use of shill bidding by auctioneers to drive up prices. There 
is no evidence suggesting that this occurred in these speci c auctions.
13 The three-bidder analog to (2) is:
v  =  b        1  __________  
hG
2 + 2HGg
    0  1  __  2   Gg    
     
b
        H(x)  dx      1  __  2   g     
    
b
        H(x)G(x)  dx +    1  __  4   (1   G)
2 H + (1   G)GH1.VOL. 100 NO. 3 731 ASKER: A STUDY OF THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF A BIDDING CARTEL
(2)  vik = b       
  1  __  2     Hr (b)(1   G i(b))
   ____________________   
(hr  (b)G i(b) + Hr  (b)g i(b))
          
where G i  (b) is the distribution function of b i, and g i  (b) is the corresponding density func-
tion.
14 Note that F i  ( (b)) = G i  (b), and f i  ( (b)) = g i  (b).
This mapping from bids and bid distributions to valuations is the key theoretical component 
of the structural empirical analysis. Crucially, equation (2) maps each observed bid to a unique 
valuation in the two-bidder knockouts. The empirical analysis focuses on the two-bidder case 
due to the lack of identi cation in a well speci ed empirical model of bidding when three or 
more bidders engage in the knockout (more detail is provided in Section V). Focusing on the 
two-bidder case also means that the estimated model has the same sidepayment structure as that 
considered by Graham, Marshall, and Richard.
The general  rst-order condition allows persistent overbidding in the knockout auction to be 
established. Lemma 1 proves the  rst step toward this end.
LEMMA 1: If the bidders objective function is denoted  ik  , then
    
  ik  ____ 
 bik
     |   
bik=vik
   =   1  __  2       
    
vik
        hr(x) dx (1   G i  (vik))   0.
PROOF:
The result is immediate from evaluating the derivative of  ik at the point bik = vik.
Lemma 1 leads to the  rst result, that ring members’ bids in the knockout auction are (weakly) 
greater than their valuations.
RESULT 1: For any number of knockout bidders bik > vik if vik   [    _  v  i  ,  
_
  v  i  ), bik = vik if vik =  
_
  v  i.
PROOF:
For any bid below vik, the standard dominance argument for Vickrey and English auctions 
implies that bik = vik is a weakly dominant bid. Provided that vik is less than the upper limit of the 
support of v ik, Lemma 1 implies that increasing bik above vik increases expected pro t (note that 
in Lemma 1 fr(x) and G i  (b) are not restricted in any way). When vik is equal to the upper limit 
of the support of v ik, bik = vik by Lemma 1.
That the structure of the knockout introduces inef ciency into the target auction is a con-
sequence of overbidding in the knockout and the use of the knockout bid as an instruction to 
the ring’s bidding agent (recall that the target auction is a standard ascending (English) style 
The four-bidder analog is:
v  =  b        1  __________  
hG
3 + 3HG
2g
   0G
2g    
    
b
       H(x) dx     1  __  2   Gg    
    
b
       H(x)G(x)dx     1  __  2   g    
    
b
       H(x) G
2(x)  dx
  +   3  __  2  (1   G)G
2 H +   3  __  4   (1   G)
2 GH +   1  __  6   (1   G)
3 H:.
Note that g, G, h, and H are shorthand for g i(b), G i(b), Hr(b), hr(b) respectively.
14 G i(b)  =   
     j i   
 
      j   Gj(b)
  __________ 
     j i   
 
       j
       g i(b) is similarly de ned.JUNE 2010 732 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
auction).
15 This means that it is possible for the ring to win the object for sale at a price higher 
than the highest valuation of the ring members. Hence, when the highest nonring valuation lies 
between the valuation of the highest ring member and that member’s knockout bid, the target 
auction will generate an inef cient allocation, since the ring will win the object as opposed to the 
nonring member who values it more.
16 This conclusion is stated as a corollary.
COROLLARY 1: The structure of the knockout auction can lead to an inef cient allocation in 
the (English) target auction.
This overbidding by the ring can be a good thing for the auctioneer. It means that in some tar-
get auctions the price is bid up to a level that would not have been reached had the ring not been 
operating. Thus, any damages that the auctioneer suffers from the presence of the ring could be 
at least partially offset by overbidding.
Because the ring can bid above its highest valuation, it follows that nonring bidders in the 
target auction may suffer damages. These damages may be incurred through two channels. First, 
when the ring wins at a price higher than its valuation, it must be the case that, were the auction 
competitive, a nonring bidder would have won. The surplus that this nonring winner fails to real-
ize when the ring wins represents a source of damages. Second, even if a nonring bidder wins, 
she may have had to face tougher bidding competition from the overbidding than that which she 
would have faced had the ring not been operating. This leads to a second source of damages, due 
to the ring’s arti cially pushing up prices.
These factors suggest that participation decisions by all parties may be affected by the ring’s 
design. Speculation on the implications of the ring’s design for participation is put off until the 
empirical analysis is completed.
The following lemma, speci c to the inverse bid function of the two-bidder knockout equation 
(2), is useful for understanding some features of the bidding function that shapes the structural 
estimation of the model. It provides an example in which equation (2) maps multiple bids to the 
same valuation.
LEMMA  2:  The  inverse  bid  function  de ned  in  equation  (2)  may  have  regions  where 
 v(b)/ b < 0.
PROOF:
The simplest proof is by example. The mean of a lognormal distribution is given by EX =   e  
 +( 
2/2)   
and the variance by VarX =   e  
2( + 
2)       e  
2 + 
2
  . Let Hr(b) be a lognormal   distribution with   =  2 
and  
2 = 0.08, and let G i  (b) be lognormal with   =  1 and  
2 = 1. It is straightforward to 
verify that a nonmonotonic inverse bid function is the result of this parameterization.
Lemma 2 is a consequence of the fact that    v(b)/ b depends on the gradients of g i  (b) and 
hr(b). The interaction of these terms can result in a nonmonotonicity. Due to the fact that v(b) as 
de ned in (2) is a function, the implication of this nonmonotonicity is that some critical points 
identi ed by (2) (and hence the more general  rst order condition preceding it) may be local 
minima. The most straightforward problem with this possible nonmonotonicity is that it can 
create a situation where, in estimation, observed bids are mapped to valuations via a part of the 
15 Note that the overbidding phenomenon does not rely on the presence of sidepayments. This is because there is 
something akin to an option value involved in having fewer competitors in the target auction.
16 Since ring members need not draw their valuations from the same distributions, the ring may also fail to allocate 
the objects that they win to the highest value ring member. This leads to a further potential source of inef ciency, albeit 
one that is well known from the existing literature on  rst price auctions.VOL. 100 NO. 3 733 ASKER: A STUDY OF THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF A BIDDING CARTEL
 rst order condition that actually de nes a local minimum.
17 This violates the assumption that 
bidders are playing optimally. In all that follows it is assumed that the data generating process 
is such that the true (population) function (2) is strictly monotonic. When estimating this model, 
this assumption is imposed via the selection criteria for smoothing parameters. See Section VI, 
which describes the structural estimation, for more details.
A. What Motivates the Use of this Ring Mechanism?
Central to understanding the mechanism used by the stamp ring is the relationship between 
bidder heterogeneity and ring design. Mailath and Zemsky (1991) show that a mechanism exists 
that enables ef cient collusion when bidders have independent private valuations drawn from 
different distributions. Their mechanism has the desirable features of expost budget balance and 
coalitional stability, meaning that there is no money left on the table and that no subcoalition of 
bidders wishes to deviate and form a separate cartel.
Mailath and Zemsky point out that, when bidders are symmetric, a very simple mechanism is 
optimal: Hold a  rst price sealed bid auction prior to the target auction; give the winner the right 
to bid in the target; and equally split the winner’s bid in the  rst price sealed bid knockout among 
the losers. This structure for the knockout is attractive for its simplicity and lack of dependence 
on the distribution function from which bidders’ types are drawn.
Asymmetries between bidders in the ring make this simple knockout design infeasible. Mailath 
and Zemsky provide a simple example in which it is better to exclude a weak bidder (a bidder 
who draws his value from a distribution that puts higher probability on lower valuations) if the 
ring cannot discriminate in making sidepayments. The intuition is simple: if, in expectation, the 
contribution of a bidder to the collusive surplus is less than the share of the total collusive surplus 
that that bidder would receive, then the ring should exclude that bidder.
However, if the ring can discriminate, it is better to include bidders, whether they are weak or 
strong. While Mailath and Zemsky characterize the optimal mechanism, it depends heavily on 
the distribution functions from which each bidder’s valuations are drawn. This in itself is a prob-
lem, which is further compounded by the fact that a game form that implements the mechanism 
is, as far as I am aware, unknown.
18
Graham, Marshall, and Richard (1990) approach the problem from another angle. They inves-
tigate the pre-1990 design for the knockout auction described in the introduction. They motivate 
their theoretical investigation by arguing that this mechanism is attractive in a complete informa-
tion setting since it gives each ring member his Shapley value. Without asymmetric information, 
it provides a way to pay each ring member his marginal contribution to the ring, taking into 
account the differences in the magnitude of their contributions.
After introducing asymmetric information, they  nd that, when the ring includes all potential 
bidders, the mechanism introduces a persistent incentive for bids to lie above valuations in the 
knockout. The intuition for this result is that bidding the object’s value in the knockout dominates 
any lower bid for the usual second price auction reasons; however, since the sidepayment is also 
17 The  discussion  of  equilibrium  existence,  monotonicity  and  continuity  in   rst  price  auctions  contained  in 
Alessandro Lizzeri and Nicola Persico (2000) is helpful in cataloging the myriad theoretical problems that this non-
monotonicity would generate if it were implied by the underlying data generating process. One such problem is that, 
even if a pure strategy monotonic equilibrium were assumed to exist, the inverse bid function would cease to be 
everywhere differentiable, which would violate an assumption needed to derive (2) and simultaneously ensure that the 
equilibrium bid density is properly de ned.
18 The mechanism in Mailath and Zemsky has one feature in common with that studied here, in that the share of 
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increasing in the bid, this added effect pushes bids above valuations (George Deltas 2002 shows 
that the overbidding incentive exists in other knockout formats).
The analyses in Mailath and Zemsky, and Graham, Marshall, and Richard suggest that in the 
face of bidder asymmetries, a ring faces a dif cult set of design tradeoffs. It can either reduce its 
potential collusive surplus by excluding weaker ring members and use a simple knockout mecha-
nism, or it can use a more complicated system that may be inef cient in terms of the ultimate 
allocation in the target auction. This later, inclusive option can also introduce inef cient alloca-
tions within the ring if ring members draw their valuations from different distributions (a result 
well known in the literature on asymmetric  rst price auctions; see Vijay Krishna 2002). The 
stamp ring appears to have chosen the latter option, suggesting that it preferred to include weak 
bidders and generate some allocative inef ciency, as opposed to attempting to exclude weaker 
bidders from the ring altogether.
Taking into account the practical dif culties associated with the implementation of the opti-
mal ring scheme proposed by Mailath and Zemsky, it is clear that some second best, compromise 
scheme needs to be adopted. Perhaps the most curious feature of the precise scheme adopted by 
the stamp ring is that the winning knockout bid serves as the limit up to which the ring will bid 
in the target auction. To examine the effects of this feature consider an alternate design in which 
the winner of the knockout had discretion as to the upper limit in the target (sidepayments have 
to be paid on the same basis as in the actual mechanism should the cartel win in the target).
For simplicity assume the ring makes all knockout bids known before the target auction and 
that two ring members bid in the knockout. The ring member who won the knockout has a value 
of   v  1  
 c  ; the second highest knockout bid is equal to   k   2  
  c
    . Now consider the bidding problem of the 
ring member in the target auction. If   k   2  
  c
     <    v  1  
 c   the standard arguments for IPV English auctions 
imply an upper limit on bidding of   v  1  
 c  . If   k   2  
  c
     >   v  1  
 c   then the ring member in the target will want to 
stop bidding below his value to reduce the chance of winning and having to pay a sidepayment 
that is greater than his actual pro t. His upper limit on bidding becomes 2  v  1  
 c       k   2  
  c
    .
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This propensity for underbidding in the absence of a link between the winning knockout bid 
and the ring’s bidding rule in the target would likely create a series of dif cult problems for the 
ring. First, the ring will still generate inef cient allocations (through not always acquiring lots 
for which they have a positive surplus at the target price). Second, the potential underbidding cre-
ates an incentive to defect from the ring either by secretly bidding against the ring in the target 
auction using an agent or by openly defecting from the ring. Third, it could promote entry by 
outside bidders due to eased competition. In contrast, the scheme actually adopted by the stamp 
ring has the advantage of promoting stability since no ring member has an incentive to be on the 
outside of a ring that can be hyperaggressive through overbidding, and outside bidders may also 
be deterred from entry due to the same inherently aggressive bidding behavior.
These considerations suggest that, when stability and the incentives for entry by outside bidders 
are taken into account, there are reasons why maintaining the link between the winning knockout 
bid and the ring’s bidding behavior in the target auction could be advantageous to the ring.
III.  The Data
This study uses data on bidding in the ring’s knockout auctions preceding 11 target sales 
occurring during the period June 5, 1996 to June 26, 1997.
20 These data were collected by the 
19 The objective function for the cartel bidder in the target is maxb        
b      (  v  1  
  c     x) h(x) dx           
b    (  k  2  
  c     x) h(x) dx. The 
bidding rule arises naturally from the  rst order condition.
20 In this industry, a sale refers to a collection of auctions of individual lots. Each auction usually takes around two 
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New York Attorney General’s department during its investigation of the ring. They were tran-
scribed from faxes and written records kept by one of the ring members.
21, 
22, 
23
For each lot in which the ring was active, these data include the date of the target auction, the 
auction house where the target auction was conducted, the lot number, the transaction price in the 
target auction, all sidepayments made within the ring and,  nally, the ring members who bid in 
the knockout and their corresponding bids. The data are generally very high quality. Where the 
data are incomplete, which is in less than three percent of observations, it is because sunlight had 
faded the faxes beyond legibility or a similar, plausibly random, event occurred.
These bidding data were augmented with data drawn from catalogs published by each auction 
house. These catalogs contain concise, but detailed, descriptions of the lots for sale, including 
a measure of the condition of the stamps, the countries or region of origin, an indication of the 
number of stamps and either the auction house’s estimate of the value at auction (expressed 
as an interval) or the value according to one of several standard references on the retail value 
of stamps. The catalogs contain detailed information on their grading metrics and auction 
procedures.
The most signi cant shortcoming of this dataset is the lack of information about the total 
number of bidders in the target auction. This is particularly problematic for assessing damages, 
as it makes it hard to formulate the correct counterfactual scenarios.
24 It is less of a problem 
for analyzing the knockout auction itself since at the time of bidding it is unlikely that the 
ring members knew exactly how many people would be bidding in any given lot in the target 
auction.
Tables 1 and 2 provide a summary of the bidding data. In Table 1 the mean winning bid of the 
target auctions is reported together with the mean bid of the knockout auctions for each of the 
nine auction houses at which the ring was active. It is notable that the mean bid in the knockout 
data is higher than the mean winning bid in the target auction data for four out of nine auction 
houses. Pooling across auction houses (other than Harmer-Schau), the mean bid in the knockout 
is $2,142 while the mean winning bid in the target auction is $2,042.
25 The data also suggests 
that the ring was successful in winning lots. The ring won 58 percent of the lots in which it was 
active. The auctions won by the ring raised $6,377,284 as compared to $10,034,754 across all 
auctions in which the ring was active.
Table 2 reorganizes the data according to the number of ring members bidding in the knockout 
auction. In 623 out of 1,781 lots, only one ring member was active. In 26 lots, eight ring members 
were active. The rest of the lots in which ring members were active had between two and seven 
bidders in the knockout. The mean winning bid in the target auction is weakly increasing in the 
number of bidders in the knockout. For lots in which there were between three and six bidders 
in the knockout, the mean winning price in the target seems fairly constant. There is a similar 
21 This ring member was notorious within the ring for being paranoid about not receiving the sidepayments that 
were owed to him.
22 I am indebted to the Antitrust Bureau of the New York Attorney General’s Department for making these data 
available to me. The case from which the data are taken is NY et al. v. Feldman et al., No. 01-cv-6691 (S.D.N.Y.). The 
vast majority of the data, and all the high quality data, fall in the June 5, 1996 to June 26, 1997 period.
23 The data also include depositions from a ring member and the taxi driver who was employed to assist in coordi-
nating the ring.
24 Without knowing the number of bidders in the target auction it is hard to let the data drive the determination of 
the second-order statistic of the values of bidders not in the ring.
25 The data from the Harmer-Schau auction are recorded in this table but are not used in the structural or reduced 
form analysis that follows. The bidding behavior in the Harmer-Schau auction seems to indicate that the ring was coor-
dinating in a way that was not consistent with the rest of the auctions. The inconsistent feature is that the transaction 
price in the target auction is almost always the same as the second highest knockout bid. Precisely what is occurring 
in the Harmer-Schau auction is unclear from both the data and the depositions. All numbers reported in this paragraph 
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increasing trend in the average median bid in each knockout auction as the number of partici-
pants increases. The probability of winning the target auction increases as the number of active 
ring members increases, suggesting that either the number of nonring bidders was not increasing 
at the same rate as ring participation, or that overbidding was more pronounced as more ring 
members participated, or some combination of these factors.
IV.  Reduced Form Analysis
The stamp ring was extremely active, bidding on over 1,700 lots in the course of a year. With 
such an active ring, it is not surprising that participation by ring members varied considerably. 
Since participation is likely to affect the returns to ring members and the damages suffered by 
sellers, I report the participation patterns found in the data together with an analysis of ring win 
rates. This leads to a discussion of the disproportionate share of sidepayments enjoyed by weaker 
ring members and, ultimately, the problems suggested by the theory in interpreting naïve esti-
mates of damages.
T     1—R    A           A       H    
Target auction Knockout auction
% of lots
won by ring
% of total est.
value won
Total number
of lots
Number
of sales Mean SD Mean SD
Christie’s 1,620 1,680 1,223 1,629 19 51 63 1
Daniel Kelleher 885 1,203 968 2,003 66 56 82 1
HR Harmer 1,296 1,767 1,277 2,060 63 66 669 2
Ivy Mader 1,424 1,584 1,327 1,757 46 55 153 1
Matthew Bennett 3,727 4,657 4,474 5,787 72 75 231 1
Robert Siegel 1,829 3,011 1,806 4,443 47 52 380 3
Sotheby’s 4,003 4,270 3,371 3,746 42 51 125 1
Spink America 1,729 2,157 1,884 2,567 48 46 78 1
Aggregate of above 2,042 3,142 2,142 3,942 58 66 1,781 11
Harmer-Schau 735 1,129 867 1,393 87 NA 189 1
Notes: All auction bids are in dollars. The number of sales refers to an event in which many lots were sold. Thus, sales 
often run over several days. Aggregate records the values corresponding to the pooled data set, excluding the Harmer-
Schau auctions. In the Harmer-Schau auctions the ring operated using an informal arrangement that differed from other 
recorded auctions. “% of total est. value won” is calculated by taking the average of the Estimated Min. and Max. val-
ues reported in catalogs (or the reported book value if Estimated Min. and Max. are not present) for lots the ring wins, 
taking the sum and dividing by total across all lots.
T     2—B          N         B              K       
Number of 
Bidders
Target auction
(winning bid)
Knockout auction
(median bid)
% of lots
won by
ring
Total
number
of lots Mean SD Mean SD
1 733 1,262 616 1,134 19 623
2 1,314 2,016 1,066 2,048 36 367
3 2,014 3,246 1,750 3,029 48 260
4 2,217 3,492 2,293 4,082 69 196
5 2,249 3,419 2,092 3,322 68 144
6 2,098 2,628 2,163 3,014 74 91
7 2,979 3,425 3,655 4,116 86 74
8 4,790 4,904 6,233 7,726 96 26
Notes: Does not include the Harmer-Schau auctions. All subsequent analysis also excludes 
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A. Participation and Ring Win Rates
The ring had 11 members during the sample period. Table 2 gives an impression of the differ-
ential participation decisions of different ring members. The weak trend that these data suggest is 
that as the value of the object for sale increases, the participation of ring members also increases. 
The rate at which the ring won the target auction has the same pattern. The analysis here runs 
in two steps. First, I examine what determined the number of ring members that bid on each lot. 
Second, I look to see how participation rates, together with other covariates, impacted the win 
rate of the ring.
Table 3 investigates the sensitivity of the number of ring members participating in the auction 
to various auction characteristics. The  rst column contains an ordinary least squares (OLS) 
regression with the number of participating bidders as the dependent variable. The second col-
umn implements a (transformed) logit speci cation in which the dependent variable is the log of 
the share of ring members participating minus the log of the share not participating. Since both 
sets of results are similar, I focus on the logit results.
Participation is increasing in the estimated price supplied by the auction house. That is, par-
ticipation is increasing in the expected price of the lot for sale (measured as the mean of the mini-
mum and maximum estimated price, (Emin + Emax)/2), although this effect is not statistically 
signi cant. The spread between the estimated maximum and minimum price has a much stron-
ger (and signi cant) effect on participation: a unit increase in the spread has an effect an order 
of magnitude greater than a unit increase in the expected price. The condition of the stamps also 
T     3—P                K        A       
Speci cation
OLS Logit
Coeffs. SE Coeffs. SE
Constant 1.596*** (0.232)  1.820*** (0.117)
(Emin + Emax)/2 0.060* (0.049) 0.031* (0.024)
(Emax   Emin) 0.402*** (0.204) 0.196** (0.103)
Catalog price  0.005* (0.007)  0.001* (0.004)
(Grade Min + Grade Max)/2 0.112*** (0.047) 0.076*** (0.023)
(Grade Max   Grade Min) 0.377*** (0.043) 0.198*** (0.022)
No grade  1.181*** (0.148)  0.492*** (0.074)
Exclusively US 0.875*** (0.187) 0.495*** (0.094)
No value   1.387*** (0.515)  0.756*** (0.259)
House HRH 0.438*** (0.213) 0.076* (0.107)
House DK 0.453** (0.274) 0.186* (0.137)
House IM  0.365* (0.242)  0.276*** (0.121)
House MB 2.043*** (0.249) 0.862*** (0.125)
House RS 0.535*** (0.219) 0.165* (0.110)
House S  0.478** (0.253)  0.322*** (0.127)
House SA  0.489** (0.273)  0.404*** (0.137)
R
2 0.261 0.255
SER 1.609 0.808
Observations 1,781 1,781
Notes: Both speci cations were implemented via an OLS procedure. In the OLS speci cation 
the dependent variable is the number of bidders in each knockout auction. In the logit speci-
 cation the dependent variable is logged share of the ring members participating minus the 
logged share of those not participating. The omitted auction house is Christie’s. Estimated 
minimum (Emin), Estimated maximum (Emax) and catalog price are all divided by 1,000.
*** Signi cant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Signi cant at the 5 percent level.
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matters (as measured by Grade Max and Grade Min).
26 Interestingly, the wider the gap between 
the lowest reported grade and the highest grade (holding the mean grade constant), the more ring 
members are likely to participate. Where no grade is supplied, participation appears to decrease 
(this is likely to re ect lots with a very large number of stamps).
Lastly, the auction house  xed effects suggest that ring members have a preference for some 
houses over others. Whether this is due to the quality of the stamps for sale, the competition in 
the auctions at these houses, or some other characteristic of the auction house is unclear.
The most striking thing about participation in the knockout auctions is that it is always incom-
plete. That is, the maximum numbers of bidders in a knockout is eight rather than the full comple-
ment of 11 ring members. Given the structure of sidepayments, this is curious, as ring members 
could expect to gain some small expected bene t from always entering a very low bid in the 
knockout. The fact that this does not occur might suggest the existence of a dynamic enforcement 
mechanism, whether based on reputation or explicit punishment rules.
27
Table 4 reports the results of a logistic regression of a dummy equal to one if the ring wins, 
on a set of observables. The point estimates from the logistic regression are reported together 
with the estimated marginal effects. An increase in the number of ring members interested in 
the lot for sale increases the chance of winning, although this effect diminishes slightly as the 
number of ring members increases. After controlling for other covariates, neither the expected 
value of the lot nor the spread in estimated prices have any signi cant effect on win probabilities. 
However the ring does appear to win more often when the stamps for sale are of a higher quality 
(as measured by (Grade Min + Grade Max)/2).
Even  after  controlling  for  other  auction  speci c  observables  the  auction  house  dummies 
remain a signi cant determinant of the ring’s propensity to win. Whether this was due to sys-
tematic differences in competition from outside bidders across auction houses, the effect of some 
unobserved lot quality or some other factor is unclear. The relative paucity of information on 
participation by outside bidders makes it dif cult to make any informed conjecture on this issue.
B. Weaker Ring Members and Outcomes in the Knockout
Table 5 looks at how the bidding outcomes of individual ring members differed in the knock-
out auctions. Columns 1 and 3 of Table 5 report the relative frequency with which a ring member 
won a knockout conditional on participating in the knockout, including and excluding knockouts 
with just one bidder (respectively). In both columns 1 and 3, ring members D, G, and H all had 
lower frequencies of winning than the other ring members. However, their frequency of receiving 
sidepayments (conditional on participating) was at least as high as the other ring members’. This 
suggests that D and G, in particular, were weaker bidders (H participated quite rarely and mainly 
in high participation knockouts). In an IPV setting, bidder strength would be a consequence of 
differences in the distribution from which bidders draw valuations. Weaker ring members would 
have value distributions that tend to place more mass on lower valuations. As a consequence, any 
bene t that a weaker bidder received from ring participation would be more likely to be in the 
form of a sidepayment. Interestingly, in his deposition, D claimed, “My objective, basically was, 
you know, make money from these people as opposed to actually buying the stamps.”
26 The variables in the regressions are the upper and lower limits of the estimate range published by the auction 
house (estimated maximum and estimated minimum, resp.), the catalog value of the stamps (if published, stamps have 
“blue books,” much like cars), the upper and lower limit of the published grade of the stamps (Grade Max and Grade 
Min, resp.; stamps are graded on, roughly, a  ve-point scale), dummies for when values or grades are not published 
and,  nally, a dummy for exclusively domestic stamp collections. The House variables are auction house dummies.
27 As reported earlier, there is no explicit evidence to support this speculation. A small  xed participation cost (e.g., 
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If D, G, and H were weaker bidders, this should be re ected in the data on sidepayments.
Figure 1 shows the distribution of sidepayments. In Figure 1 a negative number indicates that 
the ring member, in aggregate, paid sidepayments to the ring. Aggregating over all auctions, ring 
member E was the largest net contributor in this sense, with an overall contribution of $74,418. 
T     4—D                   R    W       T      A       
Speci cation
Point estimates Marginal effects
    Coeffs. SE     Coeffs. SE
Constant
+  4.059*** (0.414)  0.988*** (0.099)
# of ring members 0.854*** (0.127) 0.208*** (0.031)
(# of ring members)
2  0.046*** (0.017)  0.011*** (0.004)
(Emin + Emax)/2  0.009 (0.072)  0.002 (0.018)
(Emax   Emin) 0.291 (0.299) 0.071 (0.073)
Catalog price 0.002 (0.010) 0.001 (0.002)
(Grade Min + Grade Max)/2 0.313*** (0.069) 0.076*** (0.017)
(Grade Max   Grade Min)  0.004 (0.063)  0.001 (0.015)
No grade
+  0.045 (0.213)  0.011 (0.051)
Exclusively US
+ 0.944*** (0.268) 0.232*** (0.063)
No value
+  0.945 (1.064)  0.200 (0.183)
House HRH
+ 1.094*** (0.344) 0.264*** (0.080)
House DK
+ 1.588*** (0.411) 0.365*** (0.075)
House IM
+ 1.097*** (0.377) 0.266*** (0.085)
House MB
+ 1.091*** (0.394) 0.266*** (0.090)
House RS
+ 0.653* (0.350) 0.161* (0.086)
House S
+ 0.929** (0.390) 0.228** (0.091)
House SA
+ 1.211*** (0.421) 0.290*** (0.090)
Psuedo R
2 0.186
Observations 1,781
Notes: The dependent variable is a dummy equal to 1 if the ring won the target auction. 
Estimation is conducted using logistic regression. The omitted auction house is Christie’s. 
Estimated minimum (Emin), estimated maximum (Emax) and catalog price are all divided by 
1,000. Marginal effects for dummy variables (indicated by “+”) are P(  y=1 | 1)   P(  y=1 | 0).
*** Signi cant at the 1 percent level.
  ** Signi cant at the 5 percent level.
  * Signi cant at the 10 percent level.
T     5—K        O       ,    R    M     
Ring
member
All auctions (n   1) Auctions with at least 2 ring members interested (n   2)
% high
KO bid
# of
knockouts
% high
KO bid
% receive 
sidepayment
% pays 
sidepayments
# of
knockouts
A 40 675 33 22 12 607
B 57 196 52 21 16 175
C 34 449 20 23 5 368
D 14 715 10 20 3 686
E 39 353 38 24 21 348
F 31 120 28 28 4 116
G 11 186 10 34 5 184
H 14 56 4 34 0 50
I 44 210 44 17 20 209
J 45 878 30 22 9 686
K 42 1,075 28 21 9 861JUNE 2010 740 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
Ring members D and G received the most in net payments from the ring, getting $22,251 and 
$21,574, respectively (interestingly, G participated in only 186 knockouts, as opposed to 715 by 
D). This adds to the suggestion from Table 5, that D and G are the two most likely candidates for 
being weak in an economically signi cant way. Figure 1 also reports the distribution excluding 
the 25 lots that earned a target price of over $10,000. This changes the distribution of payments 
into the ring, reducing the relative importance of E.
28 However, the relative ef cacy of D and H 
in extracting sidepayments from the ring is unchanged.
If D, G, and H were seeking to optimize their return from the extraction of sidepayments, 
the degree of success they appeared to enjoy is surprising.
29 Their propensity to avoid winning 
knockouts and yet maintain a probability of receiving sidepayments at least as high as those of 
their strong coconspirators is especially noteworthy.
30
C. Comparing Bidding Behavior in the Knockout and Target Auctions
A naïve estimate of the extent of damages suffered by the seller from the ring’s behavior would 
be given by looking at the second highest bid in each knockout and comparing it to the transac-
tion prices in the target auction, in those target auctions that the ring actually won. Since the 
target auction is conducted as an open outcry ascending auction (or English auction), the transac-
tion price, when the ring wins, should be the valuation of the highest valuation nonring bidder 
(or within a bid increment thereof). This measure would, most likely, give an incorrect measure 
28 E was active in 18 of these 25 high value target auctions. He made sidepayments in  ve of these auctions and 
received a sidepayment in one (of $750). The largest sidepayment to the ring, made by E, was $15,500 on a lot acquired 
for $26,000. The next largest sidepayment to the ring by E was $10,750 on a lot acquired for $14,500. E’s net sidepay-
ments for the high value target auctions was $38,000 paid to the ring.
29 Note that this objective is completely consistent with the objective function in the earlier theory section.
30 In an IPV setting this is consistent with D, G, and H having value distributions that have a somewhat similar mean 
to that of the stronger bidders but have a much lower variance. This con guration can mean that D, G, and H are more 
likely to lose, but conditional on losing are more likely to have bids closer to the winning bid.
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of damages because of the strong equilibrium overbidding incentives in the knockout. This point 
becomes even clearer in the subsequent structural analysis. Nonetheless, Table 6 constructs this 
measure for various cuts of the data.
Table 6 shows that the difference between the second highest bid in the knockout and the price 
paid in the target auction increased as the target price increased. In the 25 auctions in which 
the target price exceeded $10,000, this difference averaged $3,820. Overall, the ring imposed 
$514,900 in “naïve” damages. Across the auction houses, Matthew Bennett (a specialist in stamp 
auctions) stands out as suffering the greatest naïve damages. This is due, in part, to the sale of 
some high value lots that the ring was able to get at comparatively low prices. Lastly, as participa-
tion in the ring’s knockout increased so did the naïve damages.
The problem with interpreting these naïve damages as real damages is that the incentive to 
overbid in the knockout is a confounding factor. Overbidding results in the naïve damage esti-
mates being an upper bound on the actual damages to the seller. To get a sense of the extent 
to which the naïve damages are likely to be overestimating these damages, it is necessary to 
estimate a structural model. Similarly, measures of naïve damages give little indication of any 
damages suffered by bidders outside the cartel.
V.  Structural Analysis
The value of imposing structure from an economic model on the data is that the structure can 
be used to infer the underlying distributions of valuations from the observed bids. This allows 
a wide range of questions to be asked that are not possible without a model, such as: How much 
T     6—N     D          T      A             T      M    R    M       A       
   C             K       
By  nal price in target auction
0–500
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1,000
1,001–
2,000
2,001–
3,000
3,001–
5,000
5,001–
7,000
7,001–
10,000
10,000+ Aggregate
Mean target price ($) 314 745 1,483 2,527 3,929 5,940 8,514 17,180 1,986
Mean highest knockout bid ($) 471 1,066 1,996 3,187 5,918 8,041 10,428 23,840 2,718
Mean total sidepayments ($) 42 92 154 245 622 697 526  1,910 222
Total naïve damages ($) 28,390 53,460 68,000 51,950 113,150 65,500 38,950 95,500 514,900
Mean naïve damages ($) 83 184 308 490 1,243 1,394  1,053 3,820 445
Number of lots won by ring 203 162 112 50 55 29 23 15 649
Total number of lots 341 290 221 106 91 47 37 25 1,158
By number of ring members in knockout
2 3 4 5 6 7 8 Aggregate
Mean target price ($) 1,314 2,014 2,217 2,249 2,098 2,979 4,790 1,986
Mean highest knockout bid ($) 1,281 2,327 3,197 3,282 3,301 5,750 9,496 2,718
Mean total sidepayments ($) 12 96 249 211 365 895 1,898 222
Total naïve damages ($) 8,920 50,095 97,540 60,760 66,415 132,470 98,700 514,900
Mean naïve damages ($) 24 193 498 422 730 1,790 3,796 445
Number of lots won by ring 133 126 136 98 67 64 25 649
Total number of lots 367 260 196 144  91 74 26 1,158
By auction house
Christie’s
HR
Harmer
Daniel 
Kelleher
Ivy
Mader
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Bennett
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Siegel Sotheby’s
Spink 
America Aggregate
Mean target price ($) 1,687 1,200 854 1,567 3,650 1,704 4,224 1,987 1,986
Mean highest knockout bid ($) 1,658 1,689 1,405 1,942 5,917 2,069 4,248 2,703 2,718
Mean total sidepayments ($) 67 110 108 46 681 169 103 225 222
Total naïve damages ($) 6,730 88,360 13,225 7,065 283,200 88,165 14,660 13,495 514,900
Mean naïve damages ($) 135 220 217 93 1,362 338 206 450 445
Number of lots won by ring 9 254 42 42 144 109 33 16 649
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inef ciency was introduced by the ring’s structure? How much did the ring bene t from collud-
ing? How important were bidder asymmetries in determining the bene ts from the ring struc-
ture? And,  nally, what were the damages imposed by the ring?
To answer these questions, the model developed in Section II is estimated. The description 
of the structural analysis proceeds by  rst giving a nontechnical overview of the econometric 
approach. This should give enough background to enable the reader to jump directly to the 
results and counterfactual simulations. A more detailed treatment of the structural model and 
estimation procedure follows the overview.
A. Overview of the Econometric Implementation
The primary objective of estimation is to recover the distribution of valuations of cartel mem-
bers in the knockout auction and the distribution of the value of the highest nonring bidder. The 
valuation of bidder i in knockout auction k, uik , is modeled as
  uik =  (xk  )(vik  k  )  where  (xk  ) =   e  
xk    
where xk collects variables on which auctions are observed to differ;  k is auction level heteroge-
neity observed by bidders but not by the econometrician; and vik is the private component of the 
valuation of the bidder.
31 In the basic model, without unobserved heterogeneity,  k = 1. The vari-
ables in xk are: the estimated minimum and maximum values, a catalog estimate (if provided), 
the minimum and maximum quality grades, a dummy for lots with exclusively US stamps, and a 
dummy for lots with no value estimates. The auction characteristics observed by bidders but not 
by the econometrician,  k  , includes information not in the catalogs but apparent from a physical 
inspection of the stamps as well as commonly understood conditions of the downstream stamp 
market. The bidders’ private information, vik , covers knowledge of the needs of speci c clients, 
their cost of capital and private information about market conditions.
The objective is to recover the distribution of vik and, in the model accounting for unobserved 
heterogeneity,  k. With these distributions and the empirical distribution of the highest value of 
the nonring bidders (r  ), meaningful counterfactual simulations can be run.
Due to limitations on identi cation in larger knockouts, the structural econometric analysis 
uses data only from the two-bidder knockout auctions. The ring members are classi ed into two 
groups: those who appear to be weak bidders (ring members D, G, and H) and those remaining 
ring members who appear to be stronger. Within these groups, the distributions of bidders’ valu-
ations are assumed to be identical.
The rest of the theoretical framework for estimation follows that used to derive equation (2). 
It is assumed that bidders know that they are facing one other bidder but that the identity of this 
other bidder is uncertain. In particular, each bidder does not know whether the other bidder is 
strong or weak. The empirical frequencies of each bidder participating are substituted for the  j’s 
used to form G i  (b) and g i  (b) in equation (2).
The econometric implementation begins by using the linear regression approach proposed by 
Philip Haile, Han Hong, and Matthew Shum (2003) to control for observed heterogeneity across 
auctions. This  rst stage is done by running an OLS regression on bids. The estimated residuals 
are used in the analysis that follows.
31 Assuming this multiplicatively separable form for observed covariates allows both the mean and variance of 
the value distribution to vary with observed auction characteristics, albeit in a tightly parameterized fashion. This is 
attractive, as it re ects patterns observed in the data (for more details see the Online Appendix at http://pages.stern.
nyu.edu/
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The structural analysis exploits the  rst-order condition (2) to estimate the mapping from 
observed bids to (inferred) underlying valuations. This model requires observed bids, the distri-
bution of the bids of other ring members, and the distribution of bids by nonring members in the 
target auction as inputs in order to make inferences about underlying valuations. The distribution 
functions required as inputs can be estimated using standard nonparametric techniques. Crucial 
assumptions in performing this analysis are the independence of valuations across auctions and 
bidders, as well as the assumption that bidders know the number of other bidders in the knockout.
A problem exists in the data on the winning price in the target auction. These data re ect the 
valuation of only the highest value nonring bidder when the ring wins the target auction. Thus, 
these data suffer from a selection problem when being used to infer the distribution of the highest 
value nonring bidder. Since the process generating this selection problem is observed, a proce-
dure is proposed that infers the “unselected” distribution of highest values from the “selected” 
distribution and the distribution of winning knockout bids. This procedure exploits the indepen-
dence assumption. It also assumes that the support of the “selected” distribution is a subset of 
the distribution of winning knockout bids. This latter assumption seems reasonable given the 
overbidding phenomenon observed in equilibrium in the knockout auction.
Unobserved differences between auctions are controlled for using a deconvolution technique 
based on the estimation of empirical characteristic functions  rst proposed by Tong Li and 
Quang Vuong (1998), in the context of a classical measurement error problem, and applied to the 
auction setting by Li, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) and Krasnokutskaya (2004). Here, the appli-
cation of these techniques is very similar to that in Krasnokutskaya’s paper. This deconvolution 
technique uses variance across auctions to infer a distribution of a common component of values, 
 k  , known to bidders but not to the econometrician. Variation of bids within auctions is used to 
infer the distribution of the private information element of valuations, vik.
Once the econometric analysis is completed, the estimated distributions of values, bids, and 
the observed and unobserved heterogeneity can be combined to create a set of pseudodata from 
which simulated damages and ef ciency losses can be computed. The estimation procedure is 
suf ciently quick that con dence intervals can be computed for all inferred values using a stan-
dard bootstrap, resampling at the auction level.
VI.  Detail of the Structural Analysis
A. Nonparametric Identi cation
The identi cation result in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000) is not immediately appli-
cable to the problem of inferring the underlying valuations of the ring members due to the novel 
design of the knockout auction. However, the logic behind identi cation is, in spirit, the same. 
Since, given Hr(·) and G i  (·), equation (2) provides a unique valuation, v, corresponding to 
each observed bid, the observed distribution of bids identi es a unique (latent) distribution of v. 
Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000), being concerned with the identi cation of valuation distri-
butions leading to a strictly increasing bidding equilibrium, require the inverse bid function to be 
increasing for identi cation. The same assumption is required here. As described earlier, assum-
ing that observed bids are best responses, as per equation (2), implies that the potential non-
monotonicity noted in Lemma 2 cannot occur in the underlying data generating process. Hence, 
a required maintained assumption is that the underlying inverse bid function is increasing. As 
is standard in the literature, the existence of equilibrium is assumed, and it is further assumed 
that bids conform to a single equilibrium. In all other respects, identi cation is standard. For a 
discussion of identi cation of auction models with unobserved heterogeneity, see Li and Vuong JUNE 2010 744 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
(1998) and Krasnokutskaya (2004). In the model with unobserved heterogeneity, identi cation is 
a consequence of a statistical result by Ignacy Kotlarski (1966).
32
B. Estimation Approach: Inferring the Distributions of vik and r
The  estimation  approach  adapts  that  of  Guerre,  Perrigne,  and  Vuong  (GPV).  Estimation 
exploits equation (2) by estimating the various components of the  rst-order condition and back-
ing out values. The steps in estimation are set out below. Steps speci c to the model with unob-
served auction heterogeneity are indicated with a U. The basic model, which does not account for 
unobserved auction level heterogeneity, skips these steps.
Step 1: Account for observed auction heterogeneity.
Observed auction level covariates can be controlled for using the  rst-stage regression approach 
in Haile, Hong, and Shum (2003) and applied in Patrick Bajari, Stephanie Houghton, and Steven 
Tadelis (2007) and elsewhere.
33
To adopt the  rst-stage regression approach in Haile, Hong, and Shum, the following Lemma 3 
proves useful.
LEMMA 3: Under the maintained assumption that there exists a bidding equilibrium, there 
is an equilibrium in the knockout auction such that, if the optimal bid in the knockout when 
uik = vik is bik  , the optimal bid when uik =  (xk )  vik is  (xk  )bik  , provided  (xk  ) > 0.
This Lemma is proved in the Appendix. The same result is immediate for nonring bidders in 
the (English) target auction. The value of Lemma 3 is that, if we assume that the equilibrium 
described is being played in the data, it implies that bids can be normalized by estimating  (xk  ). 
The speci cation used here is  (xk  ) =   e  
xk     , leading to the following  rst-stage regression
(3)  ln bik = xk    +  ik +  ik ,
where bik includes, for each auction k, the bids of each ring member in the knockout auction and 
the target price. That is, i   {1, 2, target}.  ik is a set of dummies for the target auction and individ-
ual ring members (equal to one if they are participating).  ik is an error term. The variables in xk 
are: the estimated minimum and maximum values, a catalog estimate (if known), the   minimum 
and maximum quality grades, a dummy for lots with exclusively US stamps and a dummy for 
lots with no value estimates. Equation (3) yields the normalized bid, ln   ˆ 
  
  b  ik = ln bik   xk    ˆ          . The 
estimation of (3) is done jointly across all auction types (both knockout and target) so that the 
relative ordering of related bids is preserved. The reason why only the two-bidder knockouts are 
estimated is that Lemma 3 does not hold for equilibrium bidding in the three-bidder, or higher, 
knockouts.
34
32 See B. L. S. Prakasa Roa (1992). Amit Gandhi and Salvador Navarro (2008) also prove this result in the context 
of production function identi cation.
33 For expositional clarity it is assumed that the  k = 1.
34 For three-bidder knockouts, an additive version of Lemma 3 does hold. This additive (rather than multiplicative) 
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Step 2(U): Separate the idiosyncratic and (unobserved) common elements of bids.
This step follows the methods developed by Li and Vuong (1998) and applied in Li, Perrigne, 
and Vuong (2000) and Krasnokutskaya (2004) to separate the unobserved (but common) hetero-
geneity from the idiosyncratic components of the knockout bids and target price. For expositional 
ease, I initially consider (hypothetical) data in which two bids are observed for each auction (that 
is, I initially set aside the presence of the target price). Lemma 3 can be exploited to write each 
(normalized) bid as a multiplicative function of a common and idiosyncratic component. This 
leads to
(4)  ln   ˆ 
  
  b  1k = ln ( k) + ln  (v1k  )  and  ln   ˆ 
  
  b  2k = ln ( k  ) + ln  (v2k  )
where the inverse of  (v) is given by equation (2) and corresponds to that component of bids 
attributable to the idiosyncratic variation in bidders’ valuations. The objective is to estimate the 
distributions of ln ( ), ln  (v2  ), and ln  (v1  ) from the observations of   ˆ 
  
  b  1 and   ˆ 
  
  b  2. When there are 
two strong bidders in a knockout auction the distributions of ln  (v2  ) and ln  (v1  ) will be the 
same. Where there is a weak and a strong bidder these distributions are different.
35 The estimator 
exploits variation across auctions to identify the distribution of ln ( ), while the variation of bids 
within auctions identi es the distributions of ln  (v1  ) and ln  (v1  ).
The estimator proposed by Li and Vuong proceeds by estimating the characteristic functions 
of the joint distribution of b1 and b2 and then exploiting a statistical result by Kotlarski that shows 
that (under assumptions given below) there is a mapping from this characteristic function to the 
characteristic functions of the marginal distributions of interest. Densities are then recovered 
from these characteristic functions using an inverse Fourier transformation.
The empirical characteristic function is estimated nonparametrically using
    ˆ 
   
       (z1, z2  ) =   1  __  n       
k=1
   
K
      exp (iz1   ˆ 
  
  b  1k + iz2    ˆ 
  
  b  2k  ).
The characteristic functions of the marginal distributions are estimated using
    ˆ 
   
     ln( )  (t  ) = exp     
0
   
t
             
     ˆ 
   
       (0, z2)/   z1  __________ 
  ˆ 
   
       (0, z2  )
     dz2
     ˆ 
   
       ln  (v2  )    (t  ) =    
  ˆ 
   
       (0, t)
  ______ 
  ˆ 
   
     ln( )  (t  )
       and        ˆ 
   
       ln  (v1  )    (t  ) =    
  ˆ 
   
       (t, 0)
  ______ 
  ˆ 
   
     ln( )  (t  )
     .
This allows densities to be recovered by taking an inverse Fourier transformation
(5)       ˆ      g  Y  (x) =    1  ___  2            Tn   
Tn
        d(t) exp ( itx)   ˆ 
   
     Y  (t  ) dt  where Y   {  ln ( ), ln  (v1  ), ln  (v2  )}
35 ln  (v1 ) always corresponds to a strong bidder.JUNE 2010 746 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
where d(t  ) is a damping function (see Peter Diggle and Peter Hall 1993). Assumptions that are 
required for this procedure are:
ASSUMPTION U:
  (a)    ˆ 
  
  b  1k and   ˆ 
  
  b  2k can be written as in (4) with E (ln  (v1)) = 0.
  (b)  ln ( ), ln  (v2  ) and ln  (v1  ) are mutually independent.
  (c)  The characteristic functions      ln( )  ,      ln (v2  )   and      ln (v1  )   are nonvanishing everywhere.
Li and Vuong provide additional regularity conditions on the smoothness and integrability of 
the characteristic functions.
Assumptions U(a) and U(b) have economic signi cance. U(b) exploits the independence of 
private information across bidders. U(a) follows from the identi cation strategy that the estima-
tor exploits. Because the distributions of ln  (v1  ) and ln  (v2  ) are identi ed from within-auction 
variation, this leaves the position of the distributions “free.” This is resolved by  xing the mean 
of ln  (v1  ) at zero. The positions of other distributions are then determined relative to this ref-
erence point. The practical implication of this is that only distributions are identi ed. That is, 
unlike the GPV estimator, the speci c valuation corresponding to an observed bid cannot be 
recovered. Lemma 3 is also crucial for this approach to work.
The data at hand add one complication. For each auction, an extra bid is observed: the transac-
tion price in the target auction. When the ring wins the target auction, this re ects the highest 
value of the nonring bidders (let these observations be denoted r*  ). For the moment the selection 
problem embodied in this variable is set aside (it is dealt with in the next step). Recall that the 
distribution of this variable is needed to recover valuations from bids. As a consequence, the pro-
cedure outlined above is applied to both pairs {  ln  (v2), ln  (v1)}, and {ln  (r*  ), ln  (v1)}. Being 
able to work with r* has the additional advantage of providing an extra source of variation with 
which to identify the distribution ln ( ), as ln (r*  ) = ln ( ) + ln (r) (the analog to (4)). Since the 
procedure can now be implemented on different types of pairs, this extra information is exploited 
by taking the average of the   ˆ          ’s implied by each type of pairing, weighted by the number of 
available observations of each combination (as suggested in Li and Vuong (1998)).
Having recovered the distributions of ln ( ), ln  (v2), ln  (v1), and ln (r), the distribution of the 
common element ln ( ) can be set aside, and step 4 (the Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong inversion 
of the bid function) can be done just using realizations of ln  (v2) and ln  (v1), and ln (r) drawn 
from the estimated distributions.
Step 3: Correct the selection bias in observations in r.
The way the data are recorded makes the empirical distribution of r somewhat complicated to 
estimate. This is because the transaction price in the target auction re ects the highest value of 
the nonring bidders only when the ring is successful in the target auction. That is, the observed 
data on r are selected. From the data we can nonparametrically estimate Hr(x | maxi I bi > x), 
hr(x | maxi I bi > x), G(maxi I bi  ), and g(maxi I bi ) using empirical distribution functions and 
kernel density estimates. These, together with the assumption of independence of private infor-
mation, can be used to compute Hr(x) and hr(x). That is, an explicit statistical model is used 
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convenience, let Hr(x | maxi I bi > x) =  
__
  H   r(x), hr(x | maxi I bi > x) =  
__
  h  r(x), G(maxi I bi) = Gm(b) 
and g(maxi I bi) = gm(b). It follows that:
  
__
  H   r(r  ) =   
       
r
        hr(x)    x  
 
      gm(  y) dydx
   ___________________   
       
 
       hr(x)    x  
 
      gm(y) dydx
   =   1  __  A       
    
r
        hr(x)    
x  
 
      gm(y) dydx
  =    1  __  A   @Hr(r)      
    
r
        hr (x) Gm  (x) dxA
  A    
  
__
  H   r(r)
  ______ 
 r
    = A 
__
  h  r(r) = hr(r)[1   Gm(r)]
so
  hr(r) = A    
 
__
  h  r(r)
  _________  
[1   Gm  (r)]
     and  Hr(r) = A     
  
  
r
            
 
__
  h  r(x)
  _________  
[1   Gm(x)]
     dx.
A can be computed by evaluating [         
 
       ( 
__
  h  r(x)/[1   Gm(x)]) dx]
 1. This integral can be evaluated 
numerically. This approach employs an assumption that the support of bids in the knockout auc-
tion has an upper bound weakly greater than that of the highest valuation of nonring bidders in 
the target auction. Given the incentive to “overbid” created by the knockout structure, this does 
not seem likely to be restrictive.
36, 
37
Step 4: Recover the distribution of vi.
This is done using the procedure  rst suggested by Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong (2000). After 
delogging, kernel density estimates of the distributions of    (v2) and  (v1  ) and r are obtained 
using a triweight kernel.
38 Estimates of distribution functions are obtained using the empirical 
distribution functions. The  j’s used to construct G i(b) and g i(b) are obtained using the empiri-
cal participation frequencies for each bidder. These estimates are then used with equation (2) to 
infer underlying values.
39
36 In principle, the observed distribution of the target price could be used to provide a lower bound, adding more 
information and increasing the precision of the estimate. In the sample here, this extra information on the lower bound 
made no difference to the estimates.
37 Philip Haile and Elie Tamer (2003) observe that jump bidding and bid increments can break the link between the 
 nal price in an English auction and the valuation that is being exploited here. I ignore these issues since jump bidding 
was only very rarely observed at the stamp auctions I attended, and the data show evidence of auction houses accom-
modating very small bid increments relative to the levels of bids. Setting these empirical reasons aside, it is unclear, in 
this application, how to implement the bounds approach that Haile and Tamer develop.
38 The triweight kernel is de ned as
K(u) =   35  ___  32   (1   u
2)
3 1(  |  u | < 1).
This kernel satis es the conditions in Guerre, Perrigne, and Vuong.
39 It is assumed that the  j’s do not vary across lots. Participation of individual bidders in auctions is not well 
explained by lot observables. For instance, when the participation of D, the most active weak bidder, is projected onto 
lot characteristics (using the same speci cation as in Table 3, excluding auction house  xed effects) using a linear prob-
ability model, only  ve percent of the variance in participation across lots is explained. Auction house  xed effects 
raise this measure to 30 percent; however it is unclear what the appropriate interpretation of these  xed effects is in 
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Step 5: Construct a set of simulated auctions.
Having estimated the distributions of interest, it remains to construct a set of simulated auc-
tions from which to construct estimates of damages, the return to the ring and ef ciency losses. 
This is done by drawing from the estimated distributions of  ,  (v2),  (v1), and r and constructing 
the valuations v1 and v2 implied by each drawn from  (v1), and  (v2) (this is the Guerre, Perrigne, 
and Vuong procedure described in Step 4). Then the model elements can be recombined to give 
a set of simulated auctions that correspond to the population from which the observed data are 
drawn.
40 Finally, auxiliary information from the data on the support of bids is used to exclude the 
two percent of simulation draws that have bids greater than the maximum observed bid or less 
than the smallest observed bid.
41
C. Practical Considerations
Executing the estimation procedure outlined above involves a series of practical issues. In 
Step 2, implementation of the estimator in equation (5) requires determination of the form of the 
damping function and determination of the smoothing parameter Tn. Step 3, in the model with 
unobserved heterogeneity, requires some trimming of the nonparametric density estimates. Step 
4 requires selection of the bandwidth of the kernel estimator and trimming to avoid inconsistency 
of the estimator at the boundaries of the support of the value distribution.
The damping function in equation (5) serves to reduce the impact of poorly estimated  uc-
tuations in the tails of the characteristic function. Following Diggle and Hall (1993), I adopt a 
damping function of the form
  d(t  ) = max 01   | t | / .    
_
  2   Tn  /, 01.
The smoothing parameter, Tn, in (5) operates in a similar way to the bandwidth in kernel esti-
mation. To select the smoothing parameter, I  rst adopt the linear extrapolation approach pro-
posed by Diggle and Hall. This sets a range of appropriate values of Tn. To re ne the selection, I 
minimize a criterion function equal to
  Criterion = >  ˆ  ND     ND  ________  ND     ?  
2
   + >  ˆ  PW     PW  ________  PW     ?  
2
   + P {nonmonotonic}
where ND refers to naïve damages and PW is the probability of the ring’s winning in the target 
auction.
42 P {nonmonotonic} is a penalty function that deters the search away from parameters that 
generate the nonmonotonicities in the bid function as highlighted in Lemma 2.
43 The “hat” nota-
tion denotes an estimated value, while the absence of a “hat” denotes the quantity in the raw data. 
40 When adding in the observed auction level heterogeneity draws are taken from the empirical joint distribution.
41 An implicit assumption underlying the validity of this simulated sample for the purposes of construction of 
counterfactuals is that the value distribution of the highest value nonring bidder be invariant to observed or unobserved 
auction level heterogeneity. This is needed for the draws of r to be correct in expectation. Since the number of nonring 
bidders is unobserved, little more can be done on this front.
42 The reduction of computational time demanded by this minimization in the generation of bootstrap estimates of 
standard errors was greatly assisted by access to the NYU supercomputing infrastructure.
43 The approach is somewhat related to that in Daniel Henderson et al. (2008). In this paper they  nd that monoto-
nicity can be imposed when using the original GPV approach to estimating  rst price auctions by using a suf ciently 
large kernel bandwidth. They then provide a re ned technique based on optimally weighting observations subject to a 
monotonicity constraint. How this weighting approach applies to the more complicated deconvolution estimator used 
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A different Tn is derived for each of ln ( ), ln  (vs  ), and ln  (vw) and ln (r), where subscript s (w) 
refers to the strong (weak) group of bidders. In the data, ln ( ) appears to be very well identi ed 
and insensitive to the value of Tn chosen. As a result Tn is set to 50 for ln ( ). This reduces the 
dimensionality of the search for values of Tn that minimize the search criterion (above). This 
search yields values of Tn for ln  (vs), ln  (vw), and ln (r) of 12.0, 3.0, and 8.3 respectively.
Density estimates from the procedure in Step 2 suffer from being imprecise in the tails in 
 nite samples. This leads to small positive densities being inferred over a very wide support. 
This creates particular problems for the selection procedure in Step 3, which requires that a ratio 
of estimated distributions and densities be taken. Hence, the imprecision in estimation in the 
extreme tails can lead to a very imprecise selection correction. This problem arises elsewhere in 
nonparametric econometrics, notably in nonparametric estimates of conditional moments (see, 
for instance, Peter Robinson 1986, and Wolfgang Hardle and Thomas Stoker 1989). This problem 
usually is dealt with by trimming in some fashion.
The  approach  taken  here  is  very  similar  to  that  taken  by  Krasnokutskaya.  The  maxi-
mum within-auction difference between (logged) bids submitted by strong bidders is used to 
set the upper and lower bounds on the support of ln  (vs  ), maintaining the requirement that 
E ln  (vs) = 0. The same region is used as the support for ln (r).
44 To estimate the upper bound 
of the support of ln  (vw) I use the maximal within-auction difference between a winning weak 
bid and losing strong bid and add this to the lower bound of the support of ln  (vs). The lower 
bound is derived analogously. If  Y is the resulting support of variable Y, then the estimator in 
equation (5) is adjusted so that
    ˆ 
  
    ˆ      g  Y  (x) =   ˆ      g  Y  (x)   1  {x  Y}  .
Kernel density estimates are estimated using a bandwidth determined by a rule-of-thumb 
approach. Each bandwidth is given by h = 1.06   ˆ          n
 1/6. Empirical distributions are also kernel-
smoothed using a rule-of-thumb approach, with bandwidth given by h = 1.06   ˆ          n
 1/5. Lastly, 
estimates of v use trimmed bid data following the method suggested in Guerre, Perrigne, and 
Vuong and the subsequent literature.
Lastly, one extreme outlier is omitted from the sample. This auction had bids of $42,500 and 
$18,000 in the knockout (the next highest knockout bid across two-bidder auctions is $13,500), 
and a recorded target price of $18,000. The strange correspondence between the second knock-
out bid and the target price, and the fact that the highest knockout bid is more than three times 
greater than any knockout bid in any other two-bidder knockout, suggests that this auction is not 
drawn from the same data generating process.
VII.  Results
The structural model outlined above allows the estimation of the magnitude of damages, 
returns to the ring and the overall inef ciency resulting from the ring’s activity in target auc-
tions with two ring members active in the associated knockout auction. After these results are 
reported, the  t of the model with unobserved auction level heterogeneity is discussed together 
with various robustness considerations.
As a preliminary, the top panel of Figure 2 shows the estimated bidding function of a strong 
bidder (all ring members other than D, G, and H) in the knockout, together with the distribution 
function of the highest valuation of the nonring bidders (the bottom panel). The bids lie above 
44 Recall that a maintained assumption is that support [  ln (r)]   support [ ln f (vs)]   support [ ln   (vw)]. It turns out 
that support [ ln   (vs)]   support [ ln f (vw)] .JUNE 2010 750 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
the 45
o line, indicating that ring members are bidding higher than their inferred valuations in the 
knockout auction. The estimated extent of this overbidding is the cornerstone of all the following 
analysis.
At low values the extent of overbidding appears to be fairly constant. Once valuations exceed 
$750 overbidding declines steadily as the likelihood of a knockout bid winning the target auc-
tion increases. The lower panel of Figure 2 shows the probability of a bid in the knockout being 
enough to win in the target auction. A bidder with a valuation of $800, who has a 44 percent 
chance of winning the target auction if he bids his value, bids $877 in the knockout. This knock-
out bid of $877 would have a 44.6 percent chance of winning the target auction. This gives some 
sense of the economic magnitude of the overbidding effect induced by the ring mechanism. The 
bidding function for a weaker bidder is very similar.
A. Damages
Table 7 shows estimates of the damages imposed on sellers by the ring, when the ring wins. 
Estimates from both the model with unobserved auction level heterogeneity and the model ignor-
ing unobserved heterogeneity are presented. The difference between the two models is illustrated 
by comparing their predicted levels of naïve damages (  = max [second highest bid in the knock-
out minus the target price, 0]) and their predicted likelihoods of the ring winning. In the data, the 
mean naïve damages, conditional on a ring win, is $67. This compares with estimated naïve dam-
ages of $74 and $150 for the models with and without unobserved heterogeneity (respectively). 
The impact of taking into account unobserved auction level heterogeneity is easy to appreciate 
from a comparison of these naïve damage estimates. When unobserved heterogeneity is not 
modeled, the level of naïve damages is over 100 percent higher. This re ects, primarily, a greater 
within-auction variance in the simulated bids, due to the absence of an unobserved auction spe-
ci c common element. Interestingly, the estimated proportion of target auctions won by the 
ring in both models is close to that in the data (0.34 and 0.37 as compared to 0.36 in the data), 
although in both cases the con dence interval is wide.
45
For those auctions won by the ring, the estimates of true damages are constructed by comput-
ing the price the seller receives when the ring is operating and subtracting the seller’s price in 
the counterfactual in which all bidders (including the active ring members) bid competitively in 
the target auction. This counterfactual is easy to compute once the map between valuations and 
knockout bids has been made, since the target auction is a simple ascending price English auc-
tion. Competitive bidding requires that bidders bid up to their valuations before dropping out.
These estimates of true damages are computed under two assumptions, labeled “upper bound” 
and “lower bound.” An exact estimate of damages requires the distribution of values of the sec-
ond highest nonring bidder to be known. This is required to construct the price under competi-
tive bidding since the second highest nonring bidder may ultimately set the price. As mentioned 
earlier, the relative weakness of these data is the lack of information about bidding in the target 
auction.
46 A consequence is that reliable estimates of the level of the second highest nonring 
45 The  rst stage OLS projection of bids on observables also plays an important role in reducing auction level het-
erogeneity. For each knockout auction k, I compute the mean bid,  k. The standard deviation of the  k’s prior to the 
OLS treatment is 1,367; after treatment the standard deviation of the  k’s computed from the normalized bids is 370.
46 In principle, the data do contain information about the distribution of the second highest nonring valuation in the 
target prices that lie above the highest knockout bid. This raises the possibility of obtaining the desired   distribution 
from a similar selection adjustment used to obtain the distribution of the highest nonring valuation. In practice, 
  however, this procedure works very poorly due to the support of the highest knockout bids not extending low enough 
to provide sensible estimates of the left-hand tail of the distribution of the second highest nonring valuation. Since this 
is the most important part of the distribution from a damages perspective, the approach was abandoned in favor of the 
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valuation cannot be obtained. In the face of this, damages are estimated under the “upper bound” 
and “lower bound” assumptions (U.B. and L.B., respectively). Under U.B. the second highest 
nonring value is assumed to be equal to the highest nonring valuation. Under L.B. the second 
highest nonring value is assumed to be equal to the minimum of the highest nonring valuation 
and the highest ring valuation. U.B. gives a (loose) upper bound to damages since it generates the 
highest model consistent price under competitive bidding. L.B. gives a (tighter) lower bound to 
damages since it generates the lowest model consistent price under competitive bidding.
In Table 7, the mean damages estimated using the model with unobserved heterogeneity are 
equal to $37 and $27 (under U.B. and L.B., respectively). When unobserved heterogeneity is 
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ignored the estimates are $105 and $99. Both models illustrate the importance of appropriate 
equilibrium analysis of damages, in that in both instances true damages are substantially less 
than the naïve damage estimates.
47
The rest of Table 7 decomposes the auctions won by the ring into three groups: auctions 
in which the competitive price and the ring price are equal; auctions in which the seller ben-
e ted from the ring (Pr > Pc); and auctions in which the ring hurt sellers (Pr < Pc). The sellers 
incurred harm in 27 percent of auctions that the ring won, with the ring decreasing prices by, on 
average, 17 percent when harm was incurred. These estimates are invariant to the U.B or L.B. 
assumptions (by construction).
Under the L.B. assumption, in 19 percent of auctions won by the ring the seller actually ben-
e ted. This is because the ring pushed the price up higher than it would have been had all bid-
ders been bidding competitively. In these auctions, the overbidding in the knockout carried over 
to the target auction, pushing the price up to the highest valuation across all bidders. Under the 
U.B. assumption, this bene t from the ring can never occur since the highest nonring valuation 
is shared by two bidders by assumption. When the seller bene ts, prices are in ated by seven 
percent, under the L.B. assumption.
It is important to note that an unmeasured source of seller bene t exists: those instances where 
a nonring bidder wins, but the ring’s propensity to overbid forces the winning bidder to pay more 
than would be the case under competitive bidding. This means that the damage estimates over-
state the damages suffered by sellers. An upper bound on the size of this effect is given in the 
discussion of Table 8, below.
47 The 90 percent con dence intervals on the ratio of true to naïve damages are, for the model with unobserved 
heterogeneity, [0.38, 0.69] (U.B. assumption) and [0.25, 0.63] (L.B. assumption). For the model without unobserved 
heterogeneity, the corresponding intervals are [0.52, 0.75] and [0.44, 0.72].
T     7—D              S     
Model With unobserved auction heterogeneity No unobserved auction heterogeneity
Assumption
Point
estimate
90% con dence interval Point
estimate
90% con dence interval
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Mean naïve damages ($) 74.21 49.10 152.74 149.53 93.40 197.74
Mean damages ($) U. B. 36.99 23.47 81.88 105.74 51.99 141.75
L. B. 26.50 16.09 73.87 99.15 44.38 136.20
Mean damage ratio U. B. 0.96 0.91 0.98 0.88 0.84 0.93
L. B. 0.97 0.93 0.98 0.89 0.85 0.95
Proportion of auctions with U. B. 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00 0.00
  Pr >  Pc L. B. 0.19 0.04 0.21 0.097 0.040 0.17
Mean damage ratio (Pr >  Pc) L. B. 1.07 1.02 1.13 1.10 1.04 1.25
Proportion of auctions with U. B. 0.27 0.17 0.39 0.34 0.23 0.43
  Pr <  Pc L. B. 0.27 0.17 0.39 0.34 0.23 0.43
Mean damage ratio (Pr <  Pc) U. B. 0.83 0.74 0.88 0.64 0.57 0.74
L. B. 0.83 0.74 0.88 0.64 0.57 0.74
Proportion of auctions with U. B. 0.73 0.61 0.83 0.66 0.57 0.77
  Pr=Pc L. B. 0.54 0.46 0.73 0.57 0.46 0.68
Proportion of target auctions won 0.34 0.08 0.49 0.37 0.18 0.45
Simulated auctions 100,000 100,000 100,000 100,000
Notes: Damage ratio is the ratio of the price received with the ring to the price received with competitive bidding. All means are over 
target auctions that the ring won (unless further conditioned as noted). L. B. = Lower Bound, U. B. = Upper Bound. Pr refers to the 
price sellers receive with the ring, Pc is the price with competitive bidding. Con dence intervals are bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations.VOL. 100 NO. 3 753 ASKER: A STUDY OF THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF A BIDDING CARTEL
This  nding, that the ring was not always detrimental to sellers, is re ected in the case materi-
als. In D’s deposition, his sense was:
“That probably in the end result the ring brings in as much money to the auction house 
as if it wasn’t there, and obviously part of that was, but there was a lot of truth in that. 
Because there are six or eight people that show up to an auction, that normally would not 
come to the auction and end up competitively bidding against the rest of the people on the 
 oor. Did I say that right, does it make sense?”
In addition to the seller, nonring bidders in the target auction could suffer damages. There are 
two sources of potential damages for these bidders:  rst, they could win the object but pay an 
in ated price from competing against the ring’s overbidding; or, second, the ring could win the 
object, but at a price higher than its valuation, resulting in misallocation.
48 When misallocation 
occurs, the other bidders’ damages are computed as their surplus captured under competitive 
bidding but forgone in the presence of the ring.
Table 8 reports damages to nonring bidders. Focusing on the model with unobserved heteroge-
neity, the ring wins the target auction 34 percent of the time. Of the auctions that the ring wins, 
19 percent result in a misallocation. Conditional on the ring winning the auction, damages to 
nonring bidders from misallocation average $10, using the L.B. assumption (by construction, no 
damages to nonring bidders can occur under the U.B. assumption). This amounts to 40 percent 
of the damages suffered by sellers under the same assumption.
Damages due to in ated prices can be assessed using the L.B. assumption (again, by construc-
tion, no damages to nonring bidders can occur under the U.B. assumption). Using estimates from 
the model with unobserved heterogeneity, the L.B. assumption provides an upper bound on the 
extent of damages to nonring bidders from price in ation due to ring overbidding. The average 
level of these damages is estimated as $104, where the average is taken across all auctions that 
the ring loses. This level of damages is high as compared to the damages incurred by sellers. At 
least in part, this is due to the fact that, under the L.B. assumption, these damages are incurred 
48 Since the target auction is English, for the ring to win and pay more than its valuation, it must be that the highest 
nonring bidder has a valuation higher than the valuation of the ring’s knockout winner. Hence, the ring winning the 
auction results in misallocation.
T     8—D              N       B      
Model With unobserved auction heterogeneity No unobserved auction heterogeneity
Point
estimate
90% con dence interval Point
estimate
90% con dence interval
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Damages due to misallocation:
  Proportion of target auctions ring won 0.34 0.08 0.49 0.37 0.18 0.45
  Proportion of target auctions ring won 
  with damages
0.19 0.04 0.21 0.10 0.04 0.17
  Mean damages (conditional on ring
  winning target auction, $)
10.48 1.18 15.31 6.60 1.67 12.68
Damages due to price in ation:
  Mean damages (conditional on ring not
  winning target auction, $)
104.20 70.34 142.76 113.49 90.82 135.43
Simulated auctions 100,000 100,000
Notes: All estimates obtained using the lower bound assumption. Con dence intervals are bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations.JUNE 2010 754 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
in every auction that the ring loses. A more realistic sense of the magnitude of these damages 
is obtained by noting that in the raw data, the target price is equal to the highest knockout bid 
in 11.5 percent of the auctions that the ring does not win. This suggests that the estimated $104 
should be de ated by a factor of  ve to give a number comparable to the damages from misal-
location. (Damages are incurred approximately ten percent of the time the ring loses, but the ring 
loses twice as often as it wins.) This gives a measure of damages due to price in ation of just 
over $20. When added to the damages from misallocation, this suggests that damages incurred 
by nonring bidders are likely to be at least as high as damages incurred by the seller. This last 
point rests on the observation that damages due to price in ation represent a direct transfer from 
nonring bidders to the seller, reducing the sellers’ damages by the same amount as they increase 
the nonring bidders’ damage.
B. Inef ciency
The misallocation that the ring’s overbidding can create leads to the possibility of inef ciency 
being introduced into the target auction.
49 This is in itself interesting since, in IPV environments, 
ascending price English auctions result in ef cient allocations. Models of ring behavior that 
assume that the ring is able to act ef ciently do not lead to any inef ciency in English auctions, 
but merely change the magnitude of the transfers (see Graham and Marshall 1987 for an exam-
ple). Here the ring does introduce inef ciency, suggesting an additional economic justi cation 
for antitrust enforcement.
That said, Table 9 shows that the ef ciency impact of the ring is small. When the ring wins, 
the average ef ciency loss is $11. This represents less than one percent of the value generated 
from the optimal allocation (reported as “Mean proportional ef ciency losses: Ring active”).
50 
To give some indication of the sense in which this is small, the proportional ef ciency loss from 
excluding the ring bidders from the auction and the proportional ef ciency loss from excluding 
the other nonring bidders were computed. The model with unobserved auction level heterogene-
ity estimates that these events result in an eight percent and 29 percent decrease in ef ciency 
relative to the optimal allocation, respectively.
Hence, while the ring does have some effect on market ef ciency, the effect appears small. 
That said, if the damages suffered by nonring bidders are as large as those indicated by the L.B. 
assumption exploited in Table 8, then this raises the possibility that the ring’s activities may 
discourage participation. Clearly, this is something that the ring itself would be keen to accen-
tuate. The estimates of the effect of excluding groups of bidders from the auction suggest that 
any impact of the ring on participation may have an economically signi cant effect on market 
ef ciency. A similar, unmeasured welfare loss may arise if sellers are deterred from bringing lots 
to auction by the ring’s activity. The data (and depositions), however, allow nothing more than 
speculation on these points.
49 As has already been noted, the presence of two distinct types of ring member, each with valuations drawn from 
a different distribution, means that the ring may also not always allocate the lots won to the members with the high-
est valuations. This is because in asymmetric  rst price auctions, the bidding functions of each type will differ (see 
Krishna 2002 for more on this point). This is what accounts for the difference between mean damages due to misal-
location in Table 8 (10.48) and mean ef ciency loss in Table 9 (10.56). The difference re ects the additional impact of 
inef cient within-ring allocation in instances where a ring member would win in competitive bidding.
50 The seller is assumed to have a zero reservation value. Hence the value created by the optimal allocation is equal 
to the highest valuation among all bidders.VOL. 100 NO. 3 755 ASKER: A STUDY OF THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF A BIDDING CARTEL
C. Returns to the Ring
The structural model also allows the returns from engaging in ring behavior to be estimated. The 
bene t that the ring enjoys from reducing competition will be offset to some extent by the incentive 
to overbid. This can result in the ring’s winning an auction at a price higher than its value. Thus, 
the ring will harm itself from time to time. Focusing on the model with unobserved heterogeneity, 
Table 10 shows that the ring manages to harm itself in this fashion in 19 percent of the auctions it 
wins. Dividing the total losses by the number of auctions won, this yields an estimate of average 
harm of $10, slightly lower than the mean ef ciency loss reported in Table 9.
51 This capacity for 
self harm is offset by the bene ts of easing competition among ring members. This positive effect 
contributes an average bene t of $37, resulting in a net average return to the ring from winning an 
auction of $26 (translating into prices that were, on average, 96 percent of the competitive price).
These estimates allow the actual ring mechanism to be compared to an ideal ring that extracts 
all the surplus available to a cartel. The returns to an ideal cartel are represented by the $37 
estimated as the bene cial component of the ring’s return. On this basis, the ring appears to be 
capturing 72 percent of the surplus available to a cartel, with the difference re ecting the costs 
incurred by having to deal with the practical problems imposed by bidder heterogeneity and a 
need to have a fairly simple mechanism. The resulting capacity for the ring to harm itself by 
paying too much for a lot is re ected in the case materials. D’s deposition contains the following 
discussion of why a ring member exited the ring in the late 1980s:
Q: Did he give a reason why it would be better for him to bid himself?
A: He felt that the prices in the ring were so of cially in ated that if you ended up buying it, 
you ended up buying [  paying? ] too much.
The gains to the ring from colluding can be decomposed further into those that accrue to the 
strong bidders (as a group) and those that accrue to the weaker bidders (again, as a group). Strong 
51 If ring members were symmetric, these two numbers would measure the same thing: the difference between 
the target price and the highest ring valuation. With asymmetric ring members, the highest ring member may not get 
allocated the lot. This means that an inef cient allocation may still generate bene ts to the ring overall in that the price 
decrease from colluding more than offsets the cost to the ring of inef cient internal allocation, but these bene ts may 
not realize the maximum possible. Hence the mean inef ciency loss in Table 9 should always be weakly greater than 
the harm reported in Table 10.
T     9—I         M      E         
Model With unobserved auction heterogeneity No unobserved auction heterogeneity
Point
estimate
90% con dence interval Point
estimate
90% con dence interval
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Mean ef ciency loss ($) 10.56 1.22 15.40 6.60 1.68 12.69
Mean proportional ef ciency losses:
  Ring active 0.004 0.0002 0.006 0.003 0.0005 0.006
  No ring bidders 0.08 0.02 0.13 0.14 0.07 0.19
  Only ring bidders 0.29 0.20 0.42 0.38 0.29 0.55
Proportion of target auctions won 0.34 0.08 0.49 0.37 0.18 0.45
Simulated auctions 100,000 100,000
Notes: Means are conditional on the ring winning. The mean proportional ef ciency losses are averages over all auctions, not just those 
won by the ring. Con dence intervals are bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations.JUNE 2010 756 THE AMERICAN ECONOMIC REVIEW
bidders capture $4.64 and weaker bidders capture $21.95 of the total $27 that the ring as a whole 
earns in expectation each time that they win. This suggests that weak bidders could be argued to 
capture a disproportionate amount of the ring’s gains (as is also the case in the raw sidepayments 
data for all auctions in which the ring is active). This raises the issue of why the strong bidders 
do not exclude the weaker ones. Given that weak bidders remained in the ring over the course 
of its history, if there were some persistent gain from excluding them the failure to do so would 
be consistent with the presence of a hold-up problem created by the possibility that an excluded 
member may inform antitrust authorities of the ring’s activities (and enjoy immunity from pros-
ecution due to leniency provisions bene ting informants).
D. Model Fit and Robustness
The results reported above focus on the structural model that explicitly accounts for auction 
level heterogeneity unobserved by the econometrician but observed by the bidders. Some aspects 
of the  t of this model have already been commented on, particularly in the discussion of Table 7. 
Figure 3 allows a more speci c evaluation of the  t of the model by comparing the densities of 
several of the model’s simulated variables to related densities from the raw data.
Panel A reports the density of the bids across knockouts from the data and the simulation. It also 
shows the density of the inferred highest value of nonring bidders. The densities of the bids have 
the same shape, albeit with the simulation having slightly thicker tails. A useful measure of  t in 
comparing these densities is the integrated absolute error, I.A.E. =       
 
    |  f  (x)     ˆ 
  
  f   (x) | dx   [0, 2]. 
This is estimated for both the full model and the model ignoring unobserved heterogeneity. In 
the full model I.A.E. is equal to 0.192, while in the model ignoring unobserved heterogeneity it 
is 0.280 (hereafter quoted in parentheses). The density of the highest nonring bidder lies to the 
right of the knockout bids. Given that, in the data, the ring wins only 36 percent of auctions, this 
is what would be expected.
In panel B, the density of the ratio of the highest nonring value to the highest knockout bid 
(from the simulation) is shown along with the ratio of the observed target price to the highest 
knockout bid from the data. Ideally, for values of this ratio that are less than one these densities 
should match, since the observed target price in this region re ects the highest nonring value. For 
the region where these ratios are greater than one, the density from the simulation should place 
more mass on higher valuations than the density from the raw data since the observed target 
price in the raw data re ects the value of the second highest nonring valuation. The simulation 
model does  ll some of these requirements, but not perfectly. As the ratios approach one from 
below, the densities start to diverge. This is the main source of unsatisfactory  t. The I.A.E. for 
T     10—R              R   
Model With unobserved auction heterogeneity No unobserved auction heterogeneity
Point
estimate
90% con dence interval Point
estimate
90% con dence interval
Lower bound Upper bound Lower bound Upper bound
Mean naïve return (equiv. damages, $) 74.21 49.10 152.74 149.53 93.40 197.74
Proportion of ring wins that harmed ring 0.19 0.04 0.21 0.097 0.040 0.17
Mean return to ring (harm, $)  10.48  15.39  1.20  6.60  12.69  1.68
Mean return to ring (bene t, $) 36.91 23.49 81.88 105.74 51.99 141.75
Mean return to ring (net, $) 26.42 16.06 73.86 99.15 44.38 136.20
Mean proportional price discount 0.96 0.91 0.98 0.88 0.84 0.93
Simulated auctions 100,000 100,000
Notes: All means are over target auctions that the ring won. Con dence intervals are bootstrapped with 5,000 iterations.VOL. 100 NO. 3 757 ASKER: A STUDY OF THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF A BIDDING CARTEL
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these densities is 0.611 (0.922), although there is no suggestion that they should correspond over 
the entire support.
Panel C shows the same set of ratios as in panel B, but substituting the second highest bid in 
the knockout (I.A.E. = 0.480 (0.899)). Panel D shows the densities of the ratio of highest strong 
knockout bid to second highest strong knockout bid (I.A.E = 0.194 (0.506)). Panel E shows the 
ratio of weak knockout bids to strong knockout bids (I.A.E. = 0.238 (0.401)). In all three cases 
the shapes of the densities in the data are re ected in the simulation, albeit with some errors.
In all these examinations of model  t the sources of disparity between the model and data 
are the same. First, the model is estimated from marginal distributions whereas (particularly in 
panels C, D, and E)  t is being judged against the characteristics of joint distributions in the data. 
Second and related, the model puts a great deal of emphasis on the independence assumption in 
constructing estimates. Where the data and model diverge gives some indication of where this 
assumption is particularly strong.
As has been pointed out above, the econometric model estimated in this paper makes con-
siderable use of the maintained assumption of independence across its many moving parts. In 
particular it is assumed that the idiosyncratic component of values is private and independent. If 
they were correlated in some way this would introduce misspeci cation into the model. The bias 
in inference resulting from such misspeci cation is not obvious. If some component of valuations 
is best modeled using a common values model, the extent to which overbidding is increased or 
decreased is unclear. Overbidding in this context means willingness to bid higher than would 
have been the case had the ring not existed. The results in Paul Milgrom and Robert Weber 
(1982) give some basis for conjecturing that the ring’s propensity to overbid may be diminished 
via the use of a  rst price style knockout (although the impact of the sidepayment scheme may 
add considerable complications). Examination of ring activity such as this, in a common value 
setting, seems a fruitful avenue for further research.
This paper focuses attention on the auctions associated with two-bidder knockouts, due to 
limits on identi cation. An assumption made in doing so is that ring bidders know that they 
are faced with only one other ring bidder. To the extent that some two-bidder knockouts have 
  uncertainty associated with them as to the number of bidders, this raises the concern that the 
sample is selected in a way that may give rise to misleading inference due to model misspeci ca-
tion.
52 To address this concern a propensity score (for the event that the auction has two bidders) 
for each auction based on auction observables was estimated. The model was then reestimated on 
two-bidder knockouts with propensity scores that place them in the top 50 percent of two-bidder 
knockouts. The full results of this exercise are reported in the Online Appendix.
53
With the full model (accounting for unobserved heterogeneity), damage estimates using the 
selected sample tend to be higher than those estimated using the full sample. However, each 
point estimate, derived from either dataset, lies within the corresponding 90 percent con dence 
interval derived from the other dataset. In the same vein, the results have the same qualitative 
features. Hence, this aspect of focusing on two-bidder knockouts appears not to have a signi cant 
effect on the economic  ndings.
Another general robustness issue is the extent to which the results from these two-bidder 
knockout settings can be extrapolated to settings where more than two bidders are active in the 
knockout. For those auctions in which more than two ring members were active, damages suf-
fered by the seller may increase due to a possibly increased likelihood that a ring member has 
the second highest value, but this may be mitigated by an increase in the extent of overbidding 
52 Where such uncertainty exists ring bidders will place a bid that is a weighted average of the optimal bids in the 
two-, three- (and so on) knockouts that they think might be possible.
53 Available at: http://pages.stern.nyu.edu/
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(Graham, Marshall, and Richard 1990  nd that overbidding increases as the number of ring 
members increases) or a greater increase in participation by outside bidders. A similar tradeoff 
needs to be weighed in forming conjectures as to the damages suffered by nonring bidders in 
these auctions. This suggests that there is no clear bias in using features of these damage esti-
mates to extrapolate to the other auctions in which the ring was active.
54
VIII.  Conclusion
The ring examined in this paper faced a series of dif cult challenges. Aside from the usual issues 
of coordination and avoiding detection, it needed to accommodate a wide range of heterogenous 
bidders, and it needed to be able to handle many transactions quickly. The mechanism that the ring 
adopted has features that seem directed at these issues, notably that sidepayments increased as the 
apparent importance of a bidder increased, as measured by the size of the knockout bid.
This came at a cost, however. The ring mechanism introduced inef ciency into the market 
that had the capacity to harm the ring. On balance, the evidence suggests that, overall, the ring 
bene ted from coordinating bidding behavior, but it was certainly the case that the bene ts from 
ring activity were diminished by the overbidding incentives created by the ring design.
Another consequence of the design is the damages that appear to have been imposed on bid-
ders who were not ring members. By introducing inef cient allocations and occasionally driving 
prices above the competitive level, the ring imposed damages on nonring bidders via two chan-
nels. Although only an upper bound on these damages can be estimated, it seems likely that these 
damages are economically signi cant.
The implications of the ring for seller revenues are less clear. It appears possible that the dam-
ages from the ring’s coordinated bidding may be offset by the capacity for the ring to push up 
prices from time to time.
The likely damages imposed on nonring bidders suggest that an important issue, impossible to 
examine in these data, is the extent to which ring activity can discourage participation by other 
bidders. The results reported here suggest that adverse participation effects may have the capac-
ity to dwarf other sources of inef ciency and damages. A deeper understanding of the extent of 
this possible source of market distortion requires further research.
The  nding that nonring bidders can suffer nontrivial damages also suggests that the way 
that damages are computed and distributed in bid rigging cases, where the target auction is an 
English auction, is worthy of reconsideration. Under both the Sherman and Clayton acts, any 
person injured in his business or property by anything forbidden in the antitrust laws is capable 
of suing for treble damages, subject to the damage being suf ciently proximate (a notion de ned 
in the case law). The  ndings in this paper suggest that the damages imposed on other bidders 
by a ring can be both suf ciently large and proximate so as to justify the recovery of damages 
by these parties. However, to the best of my knowledge, there has yet to be a claim against a ring 
brought by bidders outside the ring. The  ndings in this paper give some support to such a claim 
being brought in the future.
54 If the ratio of naïve damages to seller damages (conditional on the ring winning) were used to extrapolate dam-
ages, this would mean that sellers lost somewhere between $207,000 and $269,000 in total in those auctions that the 
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PROOF OF LEMMA 3: For ease of exposition let  (xk  ) =  . If A(x) is the cdf of a random 
variable x and there exists a random variable y such that y = x/  and B(y) is the cdf of y, then 
A(x) = B(x/   ) and a(x) = (1/ )  b(x/   ), where a(x) and b(y) are the density functions of x and y.
Having noted this, it is straightforward to derive the  rst order conditions for each ring mem-
ber’s bidding problem when the ring member’s value is given by  vi and the highest nonring 
member’s value by  r. Under these conditions each  rst order condition can be written as
(A1)     1  _________  
   1  __         ( vi   b)
     =     
    h   b  __          F  
    (b)
  ____          + H   b  __          f   
    (b)
  ____         
______________________   
  1  __  2    H    b  __         1   F  
    (b)
  ____       
 
where F i  (    (z)) =      j i   
 
         j Fj  ( j      (z))/     j i   
 
         j, f i  (    (b)) =      j i   
 
         j fj  ( j      (z))   j   (z)/     j i   
 
          j is 
the corresponding density and  j     (b) is a function mapping from the bids of ring member j to 
the corresponding value of  vj. Thus (A1) describes a system of 11 equations, one equation for 
each ring member.
Equation (A1) provides the  rst order condition de ning bi( v). What is required is to show 
that  bi(v) satis es this same condition for all i. This is done by constructing a function  i, based 
on bi(v), and showing that it satis es the above  rst order condition. It follows that the set of 
functions      i corresponds to b( v)   bi( v), which in turn allows the required relationship 
between bi(v) and bi( v) to be established for all i.
For each i let  i( v) =  bi(v) so that  i(z) =  bi(z/ ). Noting that      i  
 1  ( i(z)) =    b  i  
 1  (bi(z/ )), 
and de ning  i1  (z) =  i   (z) when   = 1, this lets      i  
 1  (x)/  =  i1  (x/ ) and (     i  
 1  (x))  =    i1(x/ ).
Substituting the set of functions   1  (b)        i  
 1  (x) for     (b) in (A1) gives
     1  _________  
   1  __        ( vi   b)
     =     
 h   b  __        F   
 
 1(b)
  ____        + H   b  __        f   
 
 1(b)
  ____       
_______________________   
  1  __  2    H    b  __        1   F  
 
 1(b)
  ____       
 
which can now be rewritten as
(A2)     1  _____ 
vi      b  __      
   =      
h  
b  __       F  1   
b  __        + H  
b  __       f  1 
b  __        1   
b  __       
____________________________   
  1  __  2    H  
b  __        1   F    1 
b  __       
  .
If we substitute b/  in equation (A2) with b*, it becomes clear that (A2) is just the set of  rst 
order conditions for bids when   = 1. This means that the set of functions  ( v) satisfy equation 
(A1). Hence, there exists an equilibrium such that:
  bi( v) =      i   
 1  ( v) =  i( v) =  bi >   v  ___      ? =  bi(v)     i.VOL. 100 NO. 3 761 ASKER: A STUDY OF THE INTERNAL ORGANIZATION OF A BIDDING CARTEL
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